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Anotace  
Cílem této práce je zaplnit mezeru v civilním výzkumu pomoci vlastní 
dvoufázové verze systémové, dynamické a interdisciplinární analýzy vývoje 
Arktického transhraničního regionu, jehož jižní hranice je limitovaná polárním 
kruhem. Výzkum je založen na předpokladech nového geopolitického myšlení a 
systémového modelování, a vnímá geostrategickou analýzu jako povinný akademický 
příspěvek k „umění‟ řízení státu. První fáze analýzy je induktivní, deskriptivní a 
statická. Definuje Arktický region jako systém pěti geostrategických akčních 
prostorů, fyzického prostoru (S1), vojenského prostoru (S2), ekonomického prostoru 
(S3), demografického prostoru (S4) a informačního prostoru (S5). Po stanovení 
základních charakteristik fyzického prostoru, analýza sociální síti je aplikovaná na 
čtyři, lidmi vytvořené prostory (S2-S5) – tj. jsou vymezené základní sítě vztahů (linky) 
mezi klíčovými hráči (body). Matice symetrických vztahů ve vojenském prostoru 
(S2), ekonomickém prostoru (S3), a demografickém prostoru (S4) ukazují vztahovou 
intenzitu. Pro faktické zobrazení toho jak změny v jednom prostoru vedou ke změnám 
v jiných prostorech, je představeno deset primárních kanálů mezi-prostorového 
afektu. Druhá fáze analýzy je deduktivní, analytická a dynamická. Jelikož se může 
region stát zónou konfliktu a nebo zónou spolupráce, dalším cílem této práce je 
předpověď, který ze dvou scénářů převládne v roce 2040. Ze začátku jsou 
představeny síly podporující a oslabující stabilitu současného systému. Dále, Lawson 
W. Brighamovy čtyři scénáře možného vývoje regionu do roku 2040 (“globalizovaný 
prostor”, “adaptivní prostor”, “opevněný prostor” a “spravedlivý prostor”) jsou 
přizpůsobeny souhře těchto sil. Na konci je nabídnut hybridní scénář jako 
nejpravděpodobnější.                      
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Abstract 
This work aims to fill the gap in the civil scientific agenda by offering its 
own, two-stage version of a systemic, dynamic, and interdisciplinary analysis of 
the developments in the Arctic transborder region; by fixing the region‟s southern 
border at the Arctic Circle, adjusting to the premises of new geopolitics, using 
systemic modeling, and viewing geostrategic analysis as an obligatory academic 
contribution to the „art‟ of statecraft.The first stage of analysis is inductive, 
descriptive, and static. It defines the Arctic region as a system of five geostrategic 
action spaces, physical space (S1), military space (S2), economic space (S3), 
demographic space (S4), and information space (S5). After defining essential 
elements of the physical environment, social network analysis is applied on four 
human-constructed geostrategic spaces (S2-S5) – i.e. the basic networks of 
relationship (links) between the key actors (nodes) are created. Matrices of 
symmetrical relationships for military space (S2), economic space (S3), and 
demographic space (S4) are constructed to demonstrate the links‟ intensity. In order 
to illustrate the fact that changes in one action space ultimately transform other 
spaces, ten possible channels of inter-space affection are illustrated. The second 
stage of analysis is deductive, analytical, and dynamic. As the region can turn into 
an area of conflict or cooperation, the work attempts to predict which scenario will 
prevail by 2040. Firstly, the forces strengthening the system‟s stability and 
weakening the system‟s stability are identified. Secondly, four Lawson W. 
Brigham‟s “Scenarios for 2040” (“Globalized Frontier”, “Adaptive Frontier”, 
“Fortress Frontier”, and “Equitable Frontier”) are adjusted to interplay of these 
forces. Finally, a „hybrid‟ scenario is offered as the most probable outcome of the 
development in the region in the next 30 years.  
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The Problematic 
The Arctic region seems unique to political geographers and geopoliticians. Firstly, 
together with the Antarctic, it has been a 'no man's land' for the most of human history 
and, consequently, it is still about to form as an international region. Secondly, it 
consists of frozen ocean (glaciers) and land (permafrost) – both are subject to 
significant change of climate due to a so-called global warming. Finally, several 
decades ago the strategic role of the region in global politics has started to change: 
while being, exclusively, a military-strategic location within the Cold-War system of 
international relations, today it is more and more an economic potential that defines 
its 'attractiveness' to a globalizing world community. These developments indicate 
that modern Arctic is in transition. Tensions arise around various topics, from 
subregion-specific (as fishing rights in the Barents Sea) to supra-regional (as 
environmental hazards, denuclearization or rights of indigenous population).   
Even though a lot has been said and written on the issue of changing politics in the 
Arctic region, a systemic, dynamic, and multi-dimensional geostrategic reflection of 
this process is still missing from the non-military
1
 scientific agenda.  
                                                        
1
 Strategic analyses of particular international regions are mainly done at the military colleges, usually 
by applying PMESII, DIME and/or SWOT frameworks. For example: KNELL Niave, 2008. 
Reemergence of the Arctic as a Strategic Location. Fort Leavenworth (Kansas): School of Advanced 
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College.  
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Aims and Objectives 
(1) to fill a gap in the systemic geostrategic analysis of international relations in the 
Arctic region; 
(2) to provide the latest quantitative and qualitative evidence on the developments in 
the region;   
(3) to offer own version of systemic geostrategic analysis of the Arctic region by 
fixing the region's southern border at the Arctic Circle, basing the analysis on the 
premises of new geopolitics, considering elements of systemic modeling in 
geopolitics, and viewing geostrategic analysis as an obligatory academic 
contribution into the practice of statecraft;   
(4) defining the Arctic geostrategic transborder region as a system of five 
geostrategic action spaces: physical space (S1), military space (S2), economic 
space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information space (S5); 
(5) applying a social network analysis – i.e. constructing the basic networks of 
relationship (links) between the key actors (nodes) – on four human-constructed 
geostrategic spaces (S2-S5);  
(6) constructing matrices of symmetrical relationships showing intensity for military 
space (S2), economic space (S3), and demographic space (S4); 
(7) merging five geostrategic action spaces into a complex system of inter-space 
affection;   
(8) evaluating the forces that strengthen and weaken the system‟s stability; 
(9) offering possible scenarios for the future strategic developments in the region; 
(10) offering directions for further research.  
Subject Significance  
According to the latest report by Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, the 
Arctic ice cover diminishes by 1-2 percent per year and this process accelerates in 
time. In 2007 some ice-free areas of the Arctic Ocean were as much as 5°C warmer 
than the long-term average. On land, the limits of permafrost also indicate a warming 
trend: most of the region, especially tundra areas, show an increased plant growth 
over the period from 1981 to 2005
2
. In practice it means that the region becomes more 
accessible from the south, in both political and economic terms.  
Various scenarios of the scramble for the polar region fuel the debates among policy-
makers. The stakes are especially high in Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, Finland – the countries actually bordering the Arctic 
region. But more than 20 other states (including the United Kingdom, Japan, China 
and South Korea) indicate readiness to invest into commercial development of the 
Arctic. The tensions to become extremely high (especially if the global economic 
recession continues), the countries can even opt for an open armed conflict over the 
disputed areas. The demonstrative military maneuvers have already started to occur.  
Unfortunately, the statesmen often lack comprehensive and adequate contributions 
from academia. Until recent, few articles and books have been devoted to geopolitical 
changes in the Polar Regions. Interdisciplinary, systematic, and macro-scale approach 
is missing from the political research on the Arctic. This situation must change.  
 
                                                        
2
 AMAP. Update on Selected Climate Issues of Concern: Observations, Short-lived Climate Forcers, 
Arctic Carbon Cycle, and Predictive Capability. Oslo: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 
2009; pp. 3-5 
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Research Questions 
Stage I of the analysis is inductive, descriptive and static. Firstly, the region‟s 
physical setting is summarized and the following question is answered: 
(1) What are the main characteristics of the Arctic physical space?  
Secondly, key nodes and links within individual Arctic geostrategic action spaces (S2-
S5) are identified. The following questions are answered: 
(2) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic economic space?  
(3) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic military space?  
(4) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic demographic space?  
(5) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic information space?  
 Stage II of the analysis is deductive, analytical and dynamic. The following 
research questions are addressed:  
(6) What forces strengthen the stability of the current system? 
(7) What forces weaken the stability of the current system? 
(8) What is the most probable scenario of international relations in the Arctic region 
by 2040, given interplay of the forces strengthening and weakening the system’s 
stability?  
Research Limitations 
Imprinting the complexity of the modern world is the main goal of any 
interdisciplinary social analysis. Given the grandiosity of the project the researcher 
must work with different scientific domains, numerous (and often conflicting) schools 
of thought, disinformation, etc. This work is limited in several ways. Firstly, there are 
several versions of systemic analysis (for example, by Robert Jervis, Saul Cohen, 
etc.). For the reason of relative simplicity, this work combines Gerard Dussouy, 
Guyla Scurgai, and Niave Knell‟s methods of geopolitical analysis. However, there 
are certain limitations. First of all, there is a risk of reproducing the integral biases (if 
such exist) of these three approaches. Secondly, there is the risk of incomplete and 
incorrect empirical data. Thirdly, due to space limits, the empirical evidence should 
be sorted. In such cases, there is always a risk of author‟s subjective selectivity. 
Fourthly, the analysis is only a partially complete systemic approach. Limited nodes 
and links between these nodes are assessed, while the connections between individual 
spaces are omitted. Finally, while the well-known problem of systemic analysis – 
issue of scale – is fixed, another methodological problem – system‟s inputs/outputs – 
is still a source of model deviance.  
Subject motivation  
In contrast to other directions of political research, geopolitics and political geography 
of the polar regions is an exciting, but, so far, a poorly analyzed area. On the other 
hand, different versions of systematic geopolitical analysis are not perfect in 
reflecting the changing climate of the Polar Regions. The author would like to start 
her academic career by applying to the Faculty‟s PhD. program (specialization: 
political geography/geopolitics) with the goal of building systemic, dynamic 
geopolitical model(s).  
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1. Introduction 
According to the latest report by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Programme
3
, the Arctic ice cover is diminishing by 1-2 percent each year. This 
process has been accelerating with time: in 2007 some ice-free areas of the Arctic 
Ocean were as much as 5°C warmer than the long-term average. On land, the limits of 
permafrost also indicate a warming trend: most of the region, especially tundra areas, 
showed an increased plant growth over the period from 1981 to 2005 (AMAP 2009: 
3-5). In practice it means that the Arctic has become more accessible from the south, 
in both political and economic terms.  
Various scenarios of the scramble for the polar region fuel debates among 
policy-makers. The stakes are especially high in Canada, Russia, the United States, 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Finland – countries whose territories 
actually lie within the Arctic Circle
4
. But more than 20 other states (including the 
United Kingdom, Japan, China and South Korea) indicate readiness to invest in 
commercialization of the region. The political and economic tensions to become 
extremely high, the countries can even opt for an open armed conflict over the 
disputed areas. Some provocative military maneuvers have already taken place.  
Unfortunately, statesmen often lack comprehensive and adequate contribution 
from academia. Until recently, relatively few articles and books have been devoted to 
polar geostrategy. Even though much has been said and written on the issue of climate 
change in the region, a systemic, dynamic, and interdisciplinary geopolitical reflection 
of this process is still missing from the civil scientific agenda
5
. So far, there are two 
main gaps in the knowledge of Arctic geopolitics: first, a still dominant national (i.e. 
not regional) perspective and, second, little debate over how regional development is 
facilitated or constrained by security policies and military activities in the region, as 
“….defining and addressing security from a regional perspective has been a difficult, 
or even taboo, issue” (Einarsson et al. 2004: 222).  
At the same time, the Arctic region occupies a unique place within the system 
of international relations. Firstly, together with the Antarctic, it has been a „no man's 
land‟ for most of human history and, consequently, it is yet to emerge as an 
                                                        
3
 Working Group of the Arctic Council; Norway, Oslo. 
4
 66° 33' northern latitude. 
5
 Strategic analyses are mainly done at the military colleges, usually by applying PMESII, DIME 
and/or SWOT frameworks to particular international regions. 
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international region. Secondly, it consists of frozen ocean (glaciers) and land 
(permafrost) – both of which are subject to a significant change of climate due to 
global warming. Thirdly, the sustained increase in energy prices makes Arctic 
hydrocarbon reserves more attractive for surveying, mining, and exporting via the 
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. Finally, several decades ago the 
strategic role of the region in global politics started to change: while it had been an 
exclusively military-strategic location within the Cold-War system of international 
relations, today its „attractiveness‟ to the global community is more and more defined 
by its economic potential. Such developments indicate that this transborder region is 
highly unstable. Tensions arise around various topics, from subregion-specific (such 
as, until recently, fishing rights in the Barents Sea) to supra-regional (such as 
denuclearization).   
This work aims at contributing to geopolitical analysis by:  
(1) providing the latest empirical evidence on the developments in the region;   
(2) offering its own version of systemic geostrategic analysis by fixing the region‟s 
southern border at the Arctic Circle, adjusting to the premises of new geopolitics, 
using systemic modeling, and viewing geostrategic analysis as an obligatory 
academic contribution to the „art‟ of statecraft;   
(3) defining the Arctic geostrategic transborder region as a system of five 
geostrategic action spaces: physical space (S1), military space (S2), economic 
space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information space (S5); 
(4) applying a social network analysis – i.e. constructing the basic networks of 
relationship (links) between the key actors (nodes) – on four human-constructed 
geostrategic spaces (S2-S5);  
(5) constructing matrices of symmetrical relationships showing intensity for military 
space (S2), economic space (S3), and demographic space (S4); 
(6) merging five geostrategic action spaces into a complex system of inter-space 
affection;   
(7) evaluating the forces that strengthen and weaken the system‟s stability; 
(8) offering possible scenarios for the future strategic developments in the region; 
(9) offering directions for further research.  
In order to accomplish these goals the work implies a two-stage geostrategic 
analysis. Stage I is inductive, descriptive and static. After summarizing the vital 
3 
 
elements of physical geography, key actors (nodes) and relationships (links) are 
identified for four human-constructed geostrategic action spaces (S2-S5). Stage II is 
deductive, analytical and dynamic. The system‟s dynamics is evaluated via a prism of 
prospects for conflict or cooperation. Four scenarios of the region‟s development by 
2040 by Lawson W. Brigham (“Globalized Frontier”, “Adaptive Frontier”, “Fortress 
Frontier”, and “Equitable Frontier”) are applied to the interplay of the forces 
strengthening and weakening the system‟s stability.  
A „hybrid‟ scenario is offered. While assuming competition (conflict) to be the 
main engine of international relations, it predicts regional integration into global 
economy to be controlled (limited) and gradual; economic activities not to boom yet; 
fishing industry to be open to the Arctic states (that will regulate the rights); air and 
marine traffic to be regulated internationally; tourism to flourish; the profile of 
indigenous peoples‟ organizations to be high; impacts of climate change to be 
dramatic over physical and human environments; the Arctic states to assert their 
sovereignty rights over resources beyond 200 nm (thus the United States is assumed 
to ratify UNCLOS); the Arctic Council to serve as a main dispute resolution 
mechanism; and outside (external) participation to be restricted to the Arctic states.       
The system is not just a simple sum of subsystems, but a complex organization 
of subsystem connections. A change in one subsystem ultimately diffuses into others. 
Some locations gain strategic significance and the others lose it, so do the political 
stakes. Merging individual action spaces into one complex perspective allows for the 
most accurate reflection and prediction of strategic developments in the region, given 
the unchanging nature of the legal international framework.  
The work is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theoretical and 
methodological considerations behind the model. Section 3 first defines the Arctic 
geostrategic transborder region as a system of six action spaces, then merges them 
into a complex perspective. Section 4 presets forces strengthening and weakening the 
system‟s stability, and embed them in Lawson W. Brigham‟s “Scenarios for 2040”. 
Section 5 summarizes the findings, assesses them against the existing literature, and 
provides directions for further research. 
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2. Systemic Geostrategic Analysis of International Relations                   
in the Arctic Region – Theory and Methodology 
According to Alexander Murphy, 
It is difficult to come up with any domain of the social sciences that is 
more complicated, contingent, and dynamic than geopolitics. Myriad 
events, arrangements, and ideas influence geopolitical developments, 
and the terrain is in constant flux. (Murphy 2010: 151) 
 This work attempts to illustrate the geostrategic effects of the changing 
climate in the Arctic transborder region. Geopolitics is understood broadly – as a 
system of ideas describing the interrelationships between politics and the 
geographical environment. In practice, these ideas translate into various forms of 
control over physical space. As a derivative of geopolitical theory, geostrategy aims 
to supply the policy-maker with a set of valuable scenarios of future developments 
within a given physical space. In its search for an interdisciplinary output, the analysis 
incorporates theoretical and methodological essentials from physical geography, 
political geography/geopolitics, political science, regionalism, international relations, 
macroeconomics, international law, human geography, sociology, and war studies.  
Firstly, the Arctic region is defined and delineated (2. 1.). Then, the evolution of 
geopolitical thought up to a new geopolitics is presented (2. 2.); the essentials of the 
systemic modeling (2. 3.) and geostrategic analysis (2. 4.) are summarized; and the 
model of systemic geostrategic analysis of international relations in the Arctic region 
is introduced (2. 5.).  
2. 1. Delineating the Arctic Transborder Region 
Although the Arctic region has been of interest to scholars since as early as the 
18
th
 century (Scoresby 1799); only in 1980s did it start to appear as a distinct 
international political region in scientific journals (Bloomfield 1981, Griffiths 1988, 
Scrivener 1989, Young 1996). One of the most probable reasons for such conceptual 
„delay‟ was that “…unlike more familiar regions, such as Southeast Asia, the Middle 
East, or South America, the Arctic consists largely of segments of nation states whose 
political centers of gravity lie, for the most part, far to the south” (Einarsson et al. 
2004: 18). Surprisingly to those who live in the region, some scholars doubt the 
appropriateness of treating the Arctic as a distinct region at all. They refer to sharp 
historical, political and economic differences among the Arctic states: “[These states] 
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are largely different and have largely different orientations to the “Arctic”… They are 
primarily related through the security conflict over the Arctic during the Cold War” 
(Keskitalo 2004: 42). In other words, the idea of the Arctic as a distinct political 
region (with a policy agenda of its own) is little more than “…an artificial construct 
that requires serious manipulation of the facts to seem credible” (Einarsson et al. 
2004: 18).  
Bordering the Arctic is a task that depends upon the subject of investigation 
and technical capability. First and foremost, it is the world‟s smallest ocean 
surrounded by islands and mainland that is, so far, frozen for the greater part of the 
year (Hnízdo 1995: 57-58). The region‟s northern limit can be defined as the 
geographic North Pole, but it is of no help in delineating the Arctic southern limit 
(Sale 2008: 15). Specifically, there is the problem of identifying which specific 
provinces/territories of the Arctic states to include in the analysis. Geographers prefer 
straight-line boundaries, such as parallels of latitude and meridians, and therefore use 
the Arctic Circle (Osherenko and Young 1989: 11). It is an exact delineation that falls 
on 66° 33' northern latitude, everywhere on the globe at a distance of 2 655 km from 
the North Pole (Keskitalo 2004: 32).  
Other definitions are mainly based on physical characteristics of the region. 
The tree line definition (an area, beyond which trees cannot grow) approximately 
coincides with the temperature definition of the Arctic, the July 10-isotherm (area 
where the mean temperature in July is ten degrees Celsius). The region can be also 
defined by permafrost, above which the soil remains frozen throughout the whole 
year. In marine environments, the boundary is seen to form where cool Arctic Ocean 
water meets warmer, saltier water. Even ecological characteristics (flora and fauna) 
can serve as the region‟s delineators. Such environmental definitions are weak in 
several ways. Some scholars point to the fact that alpine regions (higher elevations of 
mountains, wherever these may be) are physically and biologically similar to polar 
areas (Young 1992). Others believe that “…the tree line, mean temperature, and 
marine boundary of the Arctic all lie significantly farther north in northern Europe 
than in North America
6
 …[Also, these] lines are not actual lines, but rather broad 
ecological zones 50-100 km in width” (Keskitalo 2004: 30-32). Finally, because the 
changing climate alters dramatically the Arctic physical space (AMAP 2009: 14), 
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environmental delineation cannot be used when producing scenarios of future 
developments.  
There is also one prominent non-environment definition of the Arctic, which 
relies on comparison with Antarctica
7
. It is the domestic Canadian definition that 
limits the Arctic region at 60° northern latitude, analogous to the Antarctic delineation 
of 60° southern latitude (Keskitalo 2004: 32). This definition says much about 
Canada‟s symbolic treatment of the Arctic (geopolitical representations/„mental 
maps‟), but is of no use when dealing with an international transborder region with a 
certain number of actors that strive for the rational maximization of power.   
The region itself is a very broad concept. Regions can be found at all political 
levels. Defining their limits is probably the most challenging task for a researcher 
who focuses on the spatial differences among distinct locations (Romancov 2007: 
420). In political geography, the term usually refers to two basic types of areas 
defined by their historical, cultural, economic, social or political distinction from the 
surrounding area (Gallaher et al. 2009, Cihelkova 2007, Lantsov 2009, Csurgai 2009). 
The first is a world-region, such as the South Asia or the Caribbean basin, which is 
composed of multiple states and organized around specific geographic subdivisions
8
. 
The second type of region represents a typically smaller area at the sub-national level 
that is frequently associated with strong local ethnic identity, such as East Timor or 
Catalonia (Dahlman 2009: 210).  
The former, macro-scale perspective assumes three types of international 
political regions. The first is a pan-region – a large (often a „continental‟) space with 
certain politico-civilizational elements that distinguish it from other regions, such as 
Latin America or the Middle East. The second is a transnational political region that 
reflects the integration of political and cultural factors of several (minimum two) 
states, for example the African Maghreb or Scandinavia. The third type of 
international region is a transborder region. It ignores the state borders as the limits of 
national sovereignty and strives to connect the border areas of at least two states into a 
single political unit, like the Chaco region encompassing territories of Argentina, 
Bolivia and Paraguay (Hnízdo 1995: 64-91). The Arctic region belongs to the third 
type of international regions. To Northerners (i.e. indigenous populations) it is a 
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referenced (Chaturvedi 1996, Glassner 1990, Dowdeswell and Hambrey 2002, Keskitalo 2004). 
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 For example, Cold-War division (First, Second and Third Worlds), socio-economic development 
(global North and South) or newly formed regional associations (the European Union).  
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distinct region, where, potentially, a common Arctic identity could be formed – a first 
step towards a single political unit. To Southerners (i.e. states bordering the region) 
the area consists mostly of the ocean that is open to power projections (Osherenko 
and Young 1989).  
In practical terms, the delineation of the Arctic is not the primary goal of this 
work. Therefore the analysis defines the region in a manner that is compatible with 
studies of other Arctic issues, instead of adopting yet another approach to determine 
the extent of the region. This work refers to the definition based on the Arctic Circle, 
which, despite its various shortcomings,
9
 fulfills two fundamental requirements (see 
Figure 1). Firstly, given the modern change of climate („global warming‟), this 
version of delineation is probably the most stable
10
. This condition is crucial for the 
prediction of future developments. Secondly, it is beneficial in terms of empirical 
data, because specialized Arctic agencies (AMAP, AHDR, UNEP/GRID) produce 
statistical reports that always consider the area within the Arctic Circle.   
Figure 1: Political Map of the Arctic 
 
Source: <http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/arctic-map-political>. 
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 This definition of the region does not consider atmospheric circulation, faunal distribution, climate 
change, the tree line, the limits of permafrost, or general isotherm patterns. Therefore, “…it is artificial 
and irrelevant” (Chaturvedi 1996: 13).  
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Some scholars believe that there are five Arctic states – Canada, Denmark (via 
Greenland), Norway, Russia, and the United States (via Alaska) (Holmes 2008, 
O'Rourke 2010). Other researchers also include northern territories of Sweden, 
Finland, Iceland, and even the Faroe Islands (Currie 2007, Conley and Kraut 2010). 
With the exception of Iceland
11
, this work focuses on the northern territories of seven 
states (see Table 1).  
Table 1: The Arctic States‟ Territories within the Arctic Circle 
Canada Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavut; Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago 
Denmark, 
Greenland 
Qaasuitsup, Northeast Greenland National Park, Sermersooq  
Finland  Rovaniemi, Tornio Valley, Tunturi Lapland, Eastern and Northern 
Lapland 
Norway  Finnmark, Tromso, and Nordland Counties; Svalbard Archipelago, 
Jan Mayen Island, Bear Island  
Russia Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr, and 
Chukotka autonomus okrugs, Vorkuta in the Komi Republic, 
Norilsk and Igarka in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the 
Sakha Republic whose boundaries lie closest to the Arctic Circle, 
Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya Islands, Severnaya Zemlya 
Islands, New Siberian Islands, Wrangel Island  
Sweden  Norrbotten and Vasterbotten Counties 
United 
States, 
Alaska 
Barrow, North Slope and Northwest Arctic Boroughs 
2. 2. Polar Geopolitics: Old and New  
Since 1608, when Hugo Grotius introduced the Freedom of the Seas 
Doctrine
12
, the Arctic Ocean was used in the „non-rival‟ way – one country‟s use of 
the oceans for navigation did not impede another country‟s ability to navigate; while 
another important activity of the high seas, fishing, was considered inexhaustible 
(Holmes 2008: 324). As of the coastal states, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia began 
their quest for internal and external sovereignty – a long and painful journey from 
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 Grimsey island is the only territory of Iceland that is located on the Arctic Circle. It is only 5,3 sq km 
with population around 100. Therefore Iceland is excluded from the analysis.   
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 The Freedom of the Seas Doctrine allows free navigation and fishing, shared by all nations. It is 
based on the assumption that the oceans are fluid; therefore they cannot be demarcated or occupied. It 
still forms a basis for modern maritime law. 
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overlapping medieval authorities towards a modern world of mutually exclusive 
territorial jurisdictions (Jackson 2007: 5-8). However, due to the harsh climate and 
lack of technology, the Arctic region was neglected by the coastal states‟ policy-
makers up until the mid-20th century.   
According to Simon Dalby, classical geopolitics of the first half of the 20th 
century “…treats the States as autonomous spatially defined entities struggling with 
other similar entities in attempts to enlarge their power by increasing their control of 
the territory” (Dalby 1990: 40). The rise of geopolitics significantly affected 
developments in the Arctic region. Following the idea of Alfred Mahan that “…naval 
supremacy was the prerequisite to ascendancy in the world political order” (Sumida 
2003: 39), Harford Mackinder searched for ways for Great Britain to save its global 
maritime supremacy during the post-Columbian Age, when no lands were left to 
conquer, the world political system was closed, and the dominant form of power was 
that coming from the continental mass (Kearns 2009: 146). In his famous work “The 
Geographical Pivot of History” (1904) he asked: “Is not the pivot region of the 
world's politics that vast area of Euro-Asia which is inaccessible to ships [my 
emphasis] ...[but] is today about to be covered with a network of railways?” 
(Mackinder 1904: 37). Without going too deep into heartland theory,
13
 it can be 
concluded that, given the fundamental „seapower versus landpower‟ dualism, the 
main tension came from the fact that northern part of Eurasia (i.e. Tsarist and then 
Soviet Russia) was not accessible by other countries‟ fleets via the „Icy Sea‟ – the 
Arctic Ocean.  
Although Mackinder did not offer an advanced analysis on the implications 
for the Arctic for being the „Icy Sea‟, his theory made a giant impact on the further 
development of the Arctic – since the 1940s, it has been militarized. According to 
Alexander de Seversky‟s “Victory Through Air Power” (1942), the polar regions 
were the new zones of conflict. The Arctic was particularly significant because it 
comprised the shortest air route between Russia and North America (Flint 2006: 22). 
The vision of the Arctic as a future Mediterrainean of the air was “...an idea that 
contained all the elements of probability” (Fifield and Pearcy 1944: 181). Similarly, 
the region‟s maritime space gained strategic significance – the ice was not a big 
problem for nuclear submarines (Hnízdo 1995: 57). Besides, not only did it 
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accommodate the Iron Curtain, but it was also a place where the main rivals, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, shared a common border
14
 of approximately 2500 
km (Blake 2007: 98). 
Both the German and Russian schools of geopolitical thought belong to the 
tellurocratic tradition. The former, invented by Karl Haushofer, imported the 
talassocratic idea that the Arctic was a strategic location: “...from Sir Harford 
Mackinder, Haushofer seized upon the concept of the heartland” (Herwig 2003: 220). 
The latter, dominated by Eurasianists
15
, did not find support among Soviet leaders. 
Because of its German origin
16
, the very notion of geopolitics became an official 
taboo
17
 in the Soviet Union (Solovyev 2005: 129). Consequently, Germans and 
Soviets understood the particular role of the Arctic region in the same way as did 
British and Americans – as a frozen gateway to the Soviet Union. That is why, during 
World War II, the Arctic was so crucial for German and Russian submarine convoys 
(Holmes 2008: 325). 
To sum up, the Arctic was one of the primary strategic locations within the 
Cold-War system of international relations, in line with the main arguments of the 
Anglo-American school of geopolitical thought. This position left no room for non-
military use of the region by the surrounding states.  
At the beginning of 1990s the Arctic region was probably one of the first to 
experience geopolitical transition. If a Cold-War world order was more or less stable 
set of international, geographically-based power relations (Taylor 1990), the post-
Cold War period marks „geopolitical disorder‟ – the decline of postwar bipolar order, 
yet without any alternative (O'Loughlin 1994: 92). The new multipolar system 
promised equality among all international actors, leaving no rationale for imperialism: 
“…cooperation, not security competition and conflict should have become the 
defining feature of relations among great powers” (Mearsheimer 2001: 360). 
However, that did not happen.  
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 Delimitation at the Bering Strait (1867 Convention). 
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 Eurasianist ideas were popular among Russian émigrés in the 1920s. Russia was seen as a ''world of 
its own'', a ''middle continent'' (Eurasia), rather than as a land divided between Europe and Asia, with 
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 Whether geopolitics (as a science) is responsible for Nazi crimes is a highly questionable issue.  
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Yalta-Postdam system of international relations) and Brezhnev's Doctrine (limiting the sovereignty of 
the Warsaw Pact countries), but these were ''...permeated by the philosophy of realpolitik and were 
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Burdened with Cold-War militarization, the Arctic transborder region entered 
the new era of global politics, characterized by the destruction of the ozone layer, 
climate shifts, finite natural resources, topsoil erosion, deforestation, and the oceans‟ 
inability to be both food producer and waste receptacle. Pollution is produced at a rate 
that far exceeds nature‟s capacity to render it harmless, and many species are to 
become extinct (Chaturvedi 1996: 1). Can these new realities be explained by 
classical, geographically deterministic geopolitics? In the twenty-first century, 
geopolitics cannot be limited by geographical factors, despite the fact that “…because 
humans are physical beings who occupy space and have physical needs geography 
cannot be dethroned from its central position in the international sphere” (Walton 
2007: 101).  
Instead, the new thinking in geopolitics refers to geographical possibilism 
rather than determinism. Geography is one of many possible conditional factors in 
international relations, but it has a facilitating rather than a pure effect (O‟Loughlin 
and Anselin 1993). Humans have to make decisions among possible choices. Modern 
geopolitics is diachronic: it is an active process of constituting the world order rather 
than an accounting of permanent geographical constraints, where the nature of 
competition moves from the military-political sphere to the economic dimension 
(Corbridge and Agnew 1991). This is true also for the Arctic. Recent geopolitical 
analysis indicates the tendency of non-geographic factors to get ahead of the 
traditional military-oriented vision of the region (Sale and Potapov 2010, Zellen 2009, 
Keskitalo 2004, Knell 2008). 
The advocates of a critical (or postmodern) approach believe that geopolitics 
is a much broader and more complex problematic than is acknowledged in traditional 
understanding of the concept: “Geography is an inescapably social and political geo-
graphing, an „earth writing‟…[It is] a cultural and political writing of meanings and 
politics of states” (O‟Thuathail 2003: 109).  
The critical approach distinguishes between formal, practical, popular, and 
structural geopolitics. Given the scope of this work, structural geopolitics is relevant, 
because, first, it is based on social-constructivist assumption
18
 and, second, it implies 
“…the study of the structural processes and tendencies that condition how all states 
practice foreign policy. Today, these processes include globalization, 
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informationalization and the proliferating risks unleashed by the successes of our 
techno-scientific civilization across the earth” (O‟Tuathail 2003: 110). Each of these 
processes has found a significant reflection in the modern development of the Arctic 
region, but the change of climate can alone bring a paradigm shift in geopolitics 
(Chaturvedi 1996: 10). Practical geopolitics is also relevant, because geostrategic 
analysis aims at contributing to the actual making of a state‟s foreign policy.    
However, the critical tradition is so far too heterogeneous to offer a single, 
formal and non-discursive
19
 method of analysis of international relations in a 
particular international region. It is subject to a substantive methodological criticism. 
Specifically, it is blamed for the absence of a clear position of what „critical 
geopolitics‟ actually means; little consideration of non-hegemonic states or 
international political actors; and lack of attention to subjectivity and material 
environmental variables (Criekemans 2009: 40).   
2. 3. Systemic Modeling in Geopolitics 
Depending on the subject of assessment, geopolitics refers to various types of 
research design. Although systemic modeling first appeared in natural sciences 
(biology) it has been successfully applied in many branches of social sciences, 
including geopolitics (Marinchenko 2009: 24). First and foremost, it is an ancient 
idea. Greek and medieval philosophers did not ignore the system of organized totality, 
which could not be simply reduced to the sum of its parts. However, the concept of 
complexity did not allow Aristotelian science to be successful in understanding the 
physical world. In fact, it was Galileo who all abandoned reference to the All and, 
therefore, enabled real progress in Western physics. Reductionist (mono-causal) 
methods boomed in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century, but, from the beginning of the 20
th
 
century, the tendency to conceive holistic interdependence returned to all sciences: 
within a system, any modification of a unit or variable was supposed to have direct or 
indirect effects on other units (Dussouy 2010: 134). The turning point was clearly in 
sociology, where Talcott Parsons, inspired by cybernetics, came up with the action 
theory, wherein politics was understood as a functional sub-system within a society 
(Říchová 2007: 169). Every social phenomenon was treated as a structured and 
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limited complex of social relations, with both internal and external dynamics 
(Kubátová 2006: 94).  
The systemic approach also became a powerful methodological tool in 
political science as many scholars believe that it is relatively „neutral‟ (Říchová 2007: 
169). Some authors even claim that, in fact, it is the best approach ever imagined 
when comparing heterogeneous political systems (Berg-Schlosser and Stammen 
2000). David Easton (probably the first and best-known advocate of systemic thinking 
in political science) started using it as a central means of understanding how political 
systems operate (Easton 1953). Three components are assumed to be part of system: 
(1) definite actors – individual or collective; (2) definite links of interdependence 
between the actors; (3) definite borders that clearly distinguish the system from its 
surroundings
20
. Easton assumed the system‟s inputs (everything that is imported into 
the system from its surroundings), outputs (everything that is exported from the 
system to its surroundings), and feedback as the means of understanding how the 
system and its surroundings interact with, and affect, each other (Říchová 2007: 170-
171). 
The system as such is not alien to the discipline of international relations to 
which, as Michael Romancov points out, geopolitics relates the most (Romancov 
2007: 408). International relations traditions can be categorized as either positivist or 
normative
21
. The former consists of realists and neo-realists, liberalists and neo-
liberalists, followers of the British school (Daddow 2009: 60). All of them agree that 
a system of international relations exists, and its nature is anarchical. However, 
objects of their research differ (Drulák 2003: 146). Realists and neo-realists focus on 
the balance of power (Kissinger 1957), liberalists and neo-liberalists – on 
international institutions, regimes and transactions (Keohane 1984, Mitrany 1943), 
followers of the British school – on international society as an alternative to an 
international regime (Bull 1977), and critical approaches – on structural effects 
(Wallerstein 1974, 1980, 1989).  
What constitutes a system of international relations? According to Hedley 
Bull, two or more states form a system when they “have sufficient contact between 
each other, and have sufficient impact on one's other decisions, to cause them to 
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behave – at least in some measure – as parts of a whole” (Bull 1973; cited in Daddow 
2009: 106). Morton Kaplan defines six possible systems of international relations: 
„balance of power‟, „loose bipolar system‟, „tight bipolar system‟, „universal 
international system‟, „hierarchical international system‟, and „unit veto international 
system‟ (Kratochvíl and Drulák 2009: 19). Kenneth Waltz concludes that systemic 
transformations are observable elements of global politics. He also stresses the crucial 
importance of the balance of power: the causes of tension lay not so much with the 
actions of the system's units (states) but at the level of the system itself (Daddow 
2009: 103). Assuming that the relative power of each state should shape its behavior 
within this system, Waltz deduces that, in contrast to multipolarity, bipolarity is less 
likely to produce war (Daddow 2009: 124). 
Advocates of normative (critical) approach understand the system differently. 
Karl Marx‟s „global capitalism‟ is a system where (1) forces structure state 
interactions and (2) capabilities and interests are not defined in terms of raw power, 
but rather in terms of to which social class an individual belongs; the bourgeoisie or 
proletariat (Daddow 2009: 122). Immanuel Wallerstein‟s World System theory 
assumes that within the modern era of capitalist world-economy, state interactions are 
governed by unseen systemic forces; international relations are organized within the 
capitalist world-economy or empire, where the former is a short-term, transitory stage 
before the latter emerges (Drulák 2003: 114-5).  
Recent attempts to apply systemic modeling to geopolitics belong to the 
French school
22
, whose main goal is to reconstruct the strategic behavior of the 
system‟s participants. In order to be successful, these scholars react to criticism of 
systemic modeling in other fields of social sciences, especially the realm of 
international relations. On the one hand, classical international relations theories – 
Realism, Liberalism, Marxism, Functionalism – have a common feature: they 
constrain the interpretation of international relations to oversimplified reductionist 
(mono-causal) research designs. However, such approaches fail to reflect the 
complexity of the contemporary world system
23
. That can lead to a „mistaken 
diagnostics‟ of the state of international affairs, a distorted reflection of reality and, 
consequently, inappropriate policy advice (Csurgai 2009: 48). On the other hand, 
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theories of international relations tend to focus too much on the question of balance 
(Dussouy 2010b: 179). Clearly, geopolitical analysis cannot use systemic approaches 
from other branches of social sciences without modification.  
Gerard Dussouy‟s „Global Interpretation Method of the World‟ (2010) is a 
recent attempt to produce a systemic geopolitical analysis that has already provoked a 
wide academic discussion. The idea is that “...no two-dimensional map can capture 
the multi-scalar intersection of physical, demographic, strategic, socio-economic, and 
cultural-ideological forces at work in the geopolitical arena; instead, we need to think 
in terms of the interaction of all these things in different places and under varying 
circumstances” (Murphy 2010: 151). This approach adheres to the theory of German 
hermeneutics: strategies are placed into a context which always has a structure – 
„nothing is given, everything is built‟.24 According to Dussouy, it is not possible to 
adopt a strictly axiomatic approach because “...it is impossible, in all social sciences, 
to practice any sort of a priori verification” (Dussouy 2010a: 136). In fact, a 
hypothetical-deductive aspect and an empirical-inductive aspect are complementary 
approaches. Without attempting to produce a general theory, Dussouy presents a 
“...methodology for gathering data that can serve as the basis for an empiric-inductive 
theory” (Cohen 2010: 163).  
Dussouy breaks down the global system into five distinct geopolitical action 
spaces: physical, natural space (C1); demo-political space (C2); diplomatic-military 
space (C3); socio-economic space dealing with globalization (C4); symbolic, idealistic 
and cultural space (C5) (see Figure 2). C1-C4 form the system‟s objective structure and 
C5 is the system‟s subjective component. In order to discover the transforming 
tendencies, each space is subject to a spatial analysis capable of extracting structural 
logic and the obstacles it has to face (Dussouy 2010a: 143).   
The model has both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it is broad 
enough to capture almost any imaginable dimension in geopolitical practice: “viewing 
any geopolitical topic against the model could highlight which physical, structural and 
ideological realms are being emphasized and which are being taken for granted” 
(Murphy 2010: 155). Additionally, it is based on axioms that have been widely 
accepted in scientific literature (see Table 3). It is also a relatively simple method of 
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systematization that can be applied not only globally, but regionally as well. Finally, 
it offers a unique research perspective:  
...Yet attention to how we might approach the study of geopolitics 
methodologically and theoretically has not been matched by a literature 
encouraging consideration of the potential influences on geopolitical 
developments that exist within the global system'' (Murphy 2010: 155). 
 
Figure 2: Dussouy‟s „Global Interpretation Method of the World‟ 
 
Source: Dussouy 2010a, p. 143. 
Table 2: Dussouy‟s Four Axioms of Systemic Modeling in Geopolitics 
Axiom Historical example 
Systemic configuration is based upon the intention and 
capacity of participants to act in a system 
The birth of modern 
nation states 
The relative space constituting geopolitical 
configuration is organized around alternative centers 
The Cold War 
The tangible reality of a geopolitical infrastructure 
interfaces with intangible reality to determine the 
configuration 
Nationalism as a 
reaction to a globalizing 
economy 
The global system induces geopolitical spatial forms, 
mainly the territory and the network, that are the results 
of participants' strategies 
European integration 
Source: Cohen 2010, p. 157-60.     
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On the other hand, Dussouy‟s approach is subject to criticism. Alexander 
Murphy questions the general connections in the model (“under what circumstances is 
one layer more important than the others?”) and the author‟s ignorance of different 
scales of political ideology (“adding them to an already complex model would risk 
making it almost incomprehensible”) (Murphy 2010: 152-4). Saul Cohen disagrees 
with Dussouy‟s rejection of developmentalism25: “geopolitical system evolves along 
developmental principles whereby periods of great change serve as historic 
milestones that mark its progress” (Cohen 2010: 161). Robert Jervis adds that similar 
problems can be successfully solved by other methods of research, for example by 
game theory (Jervis 2010a: 170).  
Dussouy presents a systemic approach without offering any hint of how to 
construct individual action spaces. In contrast, Guyla Csurgai offers individual 
components of nine factors of geopolitical analysis without any subsequent 
systematization: elements of physical geography, natural resources, identity factors, 
geopolitical representations, ethnic composition and demography, boundaries, 
historical factors, socio-economic factors, and strategies of actors (Csurgai 2009: 51).  
2. 4. Geostrategic Analysis: Contributing to Statecraft 
According to Michael Noonan, geopolitics can be divided into two schools, 
the first consisting of organic state thinkers wishing to transcend the balance of 
power, and the second consisting of geostrategists wishing to maintain the balance of 
power. “While the first school largely disappeared with the demise of the Third Reich 
and General Karl Haushofer, the second school remains and has many different 
variants” (Bonadonna et al. 2000: 131). This work defines geostrategy as a derivative 
of geopolitics aiming at discovering the interplay between physical space and 
classical strategic goals – “answering the question how the resources of the nation, 
material and human, can be developed and utilized for the end of maximizing the total 
effectiveness of the nation in war” (Brodie 1949: 476).  
Already in Venice, as well as the Ottoman, and Ming Chinese empires
26
 three 
perspectives appeared to be primary: geography, geopolitics, and geostrategy; 
whereas “...geography was the geological reality of the earth, composed of mountains, 
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 The developmental model is a theory of the whole process of geopolitical change that takes place in 
clearly identifiable stages, and according to a distinct set of rules (Cohen 2010: 162). 
26 11th - 16th centuries.  
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rivers, seas, climate and so on; geopolitics was a combination of geological features 
(e.g. natural resources) with human activity (e.g. production and technology) that 
altered the value of places; and geostrategy described where a state directed its 
military and diplomatic efforts” (Grygiel 2006: ix-x). Consequently, “...the most 
successful states ... match their geostrategy to the underlying geopolitical reality” 
(Grygiel 2006: 1). Arthur Lykke uses the „chair metaphor‟ to describe the essence of 
strategy – the relationship between objectives (ends), concepts for accomplishing 
objectives (ways), and resources for supporting these concepts (means). Ends, ways, 
and means are presented as three legs of a stool upon which military strategy rests. If 
any leg is out of balance, the risk is too great and the strategy collapses. Therefore, 
Lykke argues that a valid strategy must have an appropriate balance of objectives, 
concepts, and resources. This can be done by adding resources, using different 
concepts, or changing the objectives (Lykke et al. 2001). 
Geostrategic analysis is an obligatory scientific contribution to the policy-
making process. The strategy should not be reduced to pure geography: “...in an era 
where no peer competitor exists and no countervailing ideology threatens the nation, 
it seems that geostrategic analysis is more useful than ever” (Bonadonna et al. 2000: 
132). Geostrategic analysis is important, because it considers information, 
infrastructure and technological developments within particular regions. To begin 
with, geopolitical theory has often rested on the premise that technology could help 
shape the geopolitical world
27
. Technological and information gaps were, and still are, 
critical to the fortunes of great powers. Not only do they drive economic and social 
progress, but “...the very concept of a revolution in military affairs is built on the 
presumption that new technologies – whether they are computer viruses or nuclear 
warheads – can have a critical impact on the outcome of conflicts if they are 
leveraged properly” (Walton 2007: 101). Infrastructure, on the other hand, acts as a 
force multiplier across the spectrum of the state‟s activities (Lonsdale 2003: 146). If a 
state‟s infrastructure is underdeveloped, it takes more time to mobilize national 
resources (military, human) in the case of conflict. Factors to be considered include: 
industrial infrastructure (water and energy supplies), transport infrastructure (road, 
rail, marine, and air networks), and hydrocarbon pipelines. 
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 Halford Mackinder believed that the railways were the key to unlock the potential of heartland – that 
signaled the rise of continental powers at the expense of the maritime states.  
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In 2008, U.S. Army Major Niave F. Knell
28
 performed a net operational 
assessment of the Arctic region. He combined three strategic frameworks. The first is 
PMESII as it considers political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and 
information subsystems of the region. They are displayed and analyzed separately as 
parts of a complex, open geopolitical system. Then, the author assesses the system‟s 
potential in order to answer the question of whether the Arctic is to reemerge as a 
strategic location; by using DIME (diplomacy, information, military, and economic), 
and SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) approaches (Knell 2008: 
10-1). However, the work exclusively solves exclusively the case of the United 
States; therefore a more regional perspective remains missing from the literature.     
2. 5. Systemic Geostrategic Analysis of                                                    
International Relations in the Arctic Transborder Region 
Defining the Arctic as an international transborder region, limiting its southern 
border by the Arctic Circle, incorporating the premises of new geopolitical thinking, 
systemic modeling, and strategic analysis, this work aims at producing an 
interdisciplinary reflection of international politics in the Arctic region. Multi-
dimensional assessment remains popular among scholars of political science/ 
international relations because it allows, firstly, to widen the spectrum of traditional 
analytic quantitative and qualitative methodology and, secondly, to improve the 
validity of forecasting (Borishpolets 2010: 141). Csurgai points to the particular cases 
of identity conflicts, „de-structured states‟, resource wars, minority issues, and 
economic rivalries – all posing a considerable challenge to the stability of the current 
international system. Consequently, “...in order to examine such situations, an 
interdisciplinary approach that integrates the multiple causes and dimensions of 
conflict is required” (Csurgai 2009: 48). Surprisingly, this approach is now more 
popular among non-academic
29
 researchers (Hakim 2000: 176). This work aims at 
bringing an interdisciplinary framework back to the academic agenda. 
Five geostrategic action spaces are constructed for the Arctic region: physical 
space (S1), military space (S2), economic space (S3), demographic space (S4), and 
information space (S5). This selection incorporates elements of the three approaches 
of Dussouy (2010), Csurgai (2009) and Knell (2008). In order to achieve maximum 
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 The 22nd U.S. Military Police Battalion (CID). 
29
 E.g. the research units of central government departments, or independent research units. 
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objectivity, potential intangible elements of the system
30
 are intentionally omitted in 
this work. Diplomacy/international law and infrastructure variables cannot be 
categorized separately as they serve as primary links within human-constructed action 
spaces. Consequently, they are mentioned for each space (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3: The Arctic Region as a System of Five Geostrategic Action Spaces 
 
S1: Physical space. Dussouy (2010) and Csurgai (2009) stress that location, 
size, physical shape, distribution of territory, climatic conditions and even deposits of 
natural resources are all factors of physical geography that should be considered in 
any geostrategic analysis, because they have “...a major impact on geopolitics in 
periods of peace as well as in war” (Csurgai 2009: 52). These are constant 
conditions
31
 that define, together with other factors, the strategic balance in a given 
international region. For example, being a buffer zone can often imply vulnerability 
for a country/region located between two or more competing powers – certainly the 
case for Lebanon and Poland. In contrast, the favorable geographic location of the 
United States became an important factor contributing to its rise as the world‟s 
superpower. Therefore, “states can elaborate efficient strategies to seize the 
opportunities provided by favorable geographic factors and reduce the vulnerabilities 
caused by certain geographic constraints” (Csurgai 2009: 54). 
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 E.g. Dussouy‟s „symbolic space‟ consisting of geopolitical representations and „mental maps‟. 
31
 Due to a continuing melting of the Arctic ice, even though elements of the natural space may seem 
relatively constant in comparison to other, human-constructed elements (e.g. economic, demographic); 
they are still in a state of flux.    
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S2: Military space. Traditionally, the international military balance enjoys a 
primary role in geostrategic studies, as “...the use of spatial dimensions in the logic of 
armed conflict, the application of geographic reasoning in the conduct of war and in 
the organization of the disposition of national defense” (Csurgai 2009: 81). Similarly 
to the case of economic integration, regional military cooperation is also an 
imprescriptible element of geostrategic research, as it allows the prediction of the 
main „practical‟ sources of conflict or cooperation (Knell 2008: 21). The following 
national security elements are relevant to geostrategic analysis: the availability of 
conventional and non-conventional (i.e. nuclear) weapons, elements of national 
defense (satellites, radar and missiles), air force, ground forces, naval bases, coast 
guards, and even indigenous forces.   
S3: Economic space. Dussouy (2010), Csurgai (2009), and Knell (2008) agree 
that a state‟s capacity to project power also depends on its economic potential. 
Without national material wealth, a state cannot maintain an effective political and 
military strategy. The recent rise of geoeconomics as a distinct branch of political 
science evidences that a comprehensive theoretical and methodological reflection of 
economic globalization is about to form (Kochetov 2010). As globalization 
accelerates, using geoeconomic strategies to achieve a state‟s international goals (e.g. 
to enlarge zone of influence) can be even more efficient than the use of military force 
(Csurgai 2009: 75). Several branches of economic science
32
 should be integrated into 
geostrategic analysis, and the following economic factors should be considered: the 
region‟s wealth, center-periphery economic disparity, the level of industrial 
development, the sector and spatial distribution of economic activities, bilateral trade 
flows (exports/imports), taxation, specifics of the labor force, the legal business 
environment, the inflow of foreign direct investments, etc. The „depth‟ of regional 
economic integration
33
 can be a powerful indicator of a state‟s adherence to 
cooperation because it implies a certain level of common institutionalization 
(Cihelková et al. 2007: 13).  
S4: Demographic space. Globalization is not an exclusive economic matter. It 
is also a demographic process that can provoke interstate migration flows, lead to 
social unrest, and even cause the outbreak of a secession movement (Csurgai 2009: 
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 Macroeconomics and international political economy (Csurgai 2009: 76). 
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 Counting from the most shallow to the most advanced form of interstate integration: regionalization, 
regional forum, state-supported regional integration, free trade area, customs union, common market, 
monetary union, economic union, and political union (Cihelková et al. 2007). 
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76-7). Because there are two primary conditions for a state's sovereignty – territory 
and population – the role of the latter is truly strategic (Jackson 2007). Neither 
strategy can be realized without an adequately educated population. Interstate social 
movements and incentives may lead to either cooperation or conflict, or both, 
depending on the goals of policy-makers. Thus, the following factors are important in 
geostrategic analysis: the ethnic composition, natural growth rate, and life expectancy 
of the population; the level of unemployment, social exclusion, and percentage of 
displaced persons; literacy rates, the availability and technical equipment of 
educational and medical institutions, available instruments of the welfare system, etc.  
S5: Information space. Given the ongoing progress in information technology, 
it becomes more and more evident that the availability and technological 
intensiveness of information plays a strategic role in a state's politics despite the fact 
that, in contrast to other forms of strategic power (sea, land, air, or space), information 
space does not have its own physical environment, except physical assets – satellites, 
cables, and computers (Lonsdale 2003: 139). Nevertheless, various forms of strategic 
power can be projected through and within this distinct environment. And, because 
weapons (e.g. malicious software) can also flow through the infosphere, this „fifth 
dimension‟ has “enormous economic, social, political, and military relevance” (Ibid.). 
Consequently, the availability of Internet access, percentage of main line- and cellular 
phone users, and the existence of local newspapers, radio or television stations should 
be incorporated into the research.     
Stage I of the analysis is inductive, descriptive and static. Firstly, the region‟s 
physical setting is summarized and the following question is answered: 
(1) What are the main characteristics of the Arctic physical space?  
Secondly, key nodes and links within individual Arctic geostrategic action 
spaces (S2-S5) are identified. The following questions are answered: 
(2) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic economic space?  
(3) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic military space?  
(4) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic demographic space?  
(5) What are the main nodes and links within the Arctic information space?  
In order to discover the strategic organization within four human-constructed 
geostrategic action spaces (S2-S5), the work refers to the methodology of social 
network analysis. Todd La Porte, author of the concept of organized social 
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complexity, concludes that this kind of analysis must rely on three factors: the number 
of units comprising the system, the relative variety of units, and the degree of the 
units‟ interdependence (La Porte 1975). A social network is a “group of actors – 
people, organizations, governments – who are linked together by some common 
actions, common membership, shared communication, or some other form of 
exchange” (Mahheim et al. 2006: 218). The framework is also concerned with the 
implications rising out of these processes (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 17).  
Assuming that power relations drive political, social and economic domains of 
human life, social network analysis is a technique that systematically characterizes the 
patterns of exchange among key actors within a given system. Consequently, “...it 
advances political science research by focusing on [both] the structure and character 
of political relationship” (Manheim et al. 2006: 227). The entities that participate in a 
network are the nodes. They can be individual or collective social units. Links are the 
ties (i.e. relationships) among the nodes, and they can have different intensities. The 
tie is inherently a property of the pair, thus it cannot be assigned to an individual 
actor. A dyad consists of a pair of actors and the possible tie between them. 
Consequently, a dyadic analysis focuses on the properties of pair-wise relationships 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994: 18). This is especially true in international politics, 
where the legal framework operates on the principle of reciprocity
34
. 
When constructing a map of such network, then, there is a number of choices 
to make: “which nodes we want to include, which resource flows we want to include, 
the extent or intensity of the flows, and the direction in which those resources flow” 
(Manheim et al. 2006: 219). Geopolitics can be internal and external. The former 
studies the domestic geopolitical circumstances of a particular state, and the latter 
deals with external (international) geopolitical conditions governing a state‟s policy-
making (Csurgai 2009: 50). This work focuses on external geopolitics, as it analyzes 
the relationship between seven Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
Russia, Sweden, and the United States).  
Since their inception in late 19th century, the social sciences have been 
dominated by a state-centric epistemology. Among the disciplines, political science 
(including geopolitics) has been the most explicitly state-centric (Brenner 1999: 46).  
The Critical school has enriched geopolitical theory with the analysis of non-state, 
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 Benefits/penalties that are granted by one state to the citizens or legal entities of another, should be 
returned in kind. 
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supra- and sub-national actors (O'Tuathail 2003), however, the scientific ground is, so 
far, insufficient. Consequently, this work relies on the state-centric approach, whereas 
the states are viewed as “politically sovereign and economically self-propelled 
entities, with state territoriality understood as the basic reference point in terms of 
which all sub- and supra-state processes are to be classified”.  
In order to make the system more shock-sustainable,
35
 a flexible selection of 
nodes and links is performed. The governments-in-power of seven Arctic states
36
 are 
viewed as the definite actors of international relations – the final decision-makers in 
judicial sense. However, in the case of a significant capability to influence the 
strategic position of state in international relations; non-state, supra- or sub-regional 
actors will be also mentioned. The selection of the links of relationship between the 
actors follows the same logic: international state-level treaties and agreements are 
prioritized.   
  Stage II of the analysis is deductive, analytical and dynamic. Firstly, it 
assesses the factors leading to conflict (forces that weaken the system‟s stability) and 
cooperation (forces that strengthen the system‟s stability) in the region. Secondly, 
after setting up a time limit for prediction, year 2040, in accordance with regional-
scale modeling essentials, four scenarios of the Arctic development by Lawson W. 
Brigham are adjusted to interplay of these forces. The prospective approach allows 
the development of scenarios – frameworks for possible evolution of the current 
geostrategic situation in a given international region. “Prospective is not telling the 
future. However, it can play an important role for analyzing the trends by developing 
future scenarios; thus geopolitical prospective helps to anticipate different situations” 
(Csurgai 2009: 51). The following research questions are addressed:  
(6) What forces strengthen the stability of the current system? 
(7) What forces weaken the stability of the current system? 
(8) What is the most probable scenario of international relations in the Arctic region 
by 2040, given interplay of the forces strengthening and weakening the system’s 
stability?  
The empirical data is taken from English, Czech and Russian scientific 
monographs, textbooks, and journals (Geopolitics, Foreign Affairs, Parameters, 
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 The ability of a system to absorb change and adjust itself to new environment. 
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 See Section 2. 1.  
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World Politics, Journal of International Affairs, Global Governance, Central 
European Journal of International and Security Studies, Rossiya v globalnoj politike, 
Obshestvennye nauki i sovremennost, Acta Politologica, Mezinárodní vztahy, etc.), 
online social science library (questia.com), reports by international organizations 
(AMAP, WB, UNEP, Pugwash Group, CIA, CSIS, EU Commission DG Trade, 
NSIDC, OSCE, WSD, WNA, etc.), national statistical agencies, map collections 
(grida.no, arctic-council.org, etc.), media reports, conference and roundtable outputs, 
and Arctic States‟ foreign and regional policies. 
Limitations. Imprinting the complexity of the modern world is the main goal 
of any interdisciplinary geopolitical analysis. Given the scope of the project the 
researcher must work with different (and often conflicting) schools of thought, 
disinformation, etc. This work is limited in several ways. Firstly, there are several 
versions of systemic analysis (e.g. the ones by Robert Jervis or Saul Cohen). For the 
reason of relative simplicity, this work combines Gerard Dussouy, Guyla Csurgai, and 
Niave Knell‟s methods of geopolitical analysis. However, there are certain 
limitations. First of all, there is a risk of reproducing the integral biases (if such exist) 
of these three approaches. Secondly, there is the risk of incomplete and incorrect 
empirical data. Thirdly, due to limits of space, the empirical evidence should be 
sorted. In such cases, there is always a risk of the author‟s subjective selectivity. 
Fourthly, the analysis is only a partially complete systemic approach; limited nodes, 
and links between these nodes, are assessed, while connections between individual 
spaces are omitted. The six geostrategic action spaces do not exist in vacuum. They 
are open to influence from the system‟s surroundings. Also, they are interdependent: 
for example, certain geographic factors (such as climate, vegetation, arable land, 
natural resources, etc.) influence military capability and the economic activity of the 
state, which, in turn, can have a direct impact not only on the environment, but also 
on technological progress and the wealth of the state. Fifth, there are general limits to 
formal model-building ('if slightly inaccurate values are assigned to just a few 
variables – a likely situation given the verification problem – the results can be 
meaningless') (Murphy 2010: 152-4). Finally, while the well-known problem of 
systemic analysis – issue of scale – is fixed, another methodological problem – the 
system‟s inputs, outputs, and feedback – is still a source of deviance for the model.  
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3. The Arctic Region as a System of Five Geostrategic Action Spaces 
The Arctic region is a perfect example of an open, complex system. It interacts 
with its surroundings. Both can adapt, and both are affected by the environment 
(Knell 2008: 8). The processes within a system exist as a set of interconnected 
elements, as changes in the some nodes or links ultimately result in changes 
elsewhere in the system. For example, as water travels clockwise around the North 
Pole, a potential oil spill on the one side of the Arctic will cause damage on the other. 
This may first change the migration patterns of some Arctic fish, but will eventually 
affect predators and finally some of the indigenous people whose survival depends on 
hunting. If some Arctic states decide to change their oil transit procedures, the price 
of oil and the shipping industry would be affected immediately.  
Knell then points to the fact that “…any purely linear approach to the Arctic 
would be doomed because it would not recognize the complexity and the second and 
third order effects of any one action… It is then necessary to study the system‟s 
dynamic interaction of parts” (Ibid.). This research distinguishes between five distinct 
geostrategic action spaces of the Arctic region – physical space (S1), military space 
(S2), economic space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information space (S5). 
3. 1. Physical Space (S1) 
The Arctic Circle delimits the unique geographical space and the world‟s 
largest intact ecosystem (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 6). It includes the northernmost coastal 
parts of three continents: North America, Europe and Asia; a series of archipelagos 
between them; and the relatively enclosed waters of the ocean surrounding the 
geographical North Pole (Dowdeswell and Hambrey 2002: 6). The Arctic physical 
space is an open, complex system. Internally, it depends on the balance between land, 
coastal and marine resources (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 12). Externally, it is subject to the 
atmosphere, oceans and rivers that feed it. 
Geology. The Arctic Ocean is the world‟s smallest ocean37. Approximately 
half of its floor is a shallow extension of the bordering countries‟ land (continental 
shelf), and the other half is a deep basin. The relief is distributed unequally: the 
continental shelves of Eurasia are extensive – they occupy 35 percent of the area of 
the Arctic Ocean, yet account for only two percent of the water volume (Sale 2008: 
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 It spans over 14 million sq km, which makes it less than twice the size of the United States. 
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37). The Siberian shelf, which forms part of the Eurasian shelves, is the world‟s 
widest – 900 km. North America is almost twice as close to deep oceanic basins as 
Eurasia. The Arctic basin (consisting of the Nansen Basin, Fram Basin, Makarov 
Basin, and the Canadian Basin) is defined by several Arctic ridges (Mid-Atlantic 
Ridge, Nansen-Gakkel Ridge, Lomonosov Ridge, and Alpha Cordillera/Mendeleev 
Ridge). The deepest place is the Fram Basin (4500 m). The seas that overlie the 
Eurasian shelves – Barents Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East Siberian Sea, and 
Chukchi Sea – are mostly shallow, being only 10-20 m deep. In contrast, the depth of 
the Greenland Sea and the Norwegian Sea exceeds 2000 m. The North American 
continental shelf is also covered by the Baffin Bay and the Beaufort Sea (1000 m and 
3000 m deep, respectively). A differentiated depth of the ocean may affect, among 
others, the character of the region‟s traffic.    
On the surface, the landscape is extremely diverse: it varies from pack and 
drift ice to rugged shores, flat coasts, hills, glaciers, mountains surpassing 3500 m 
above sea level
38
, and seismically active areas
39
 (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 7). The land is 
covered by a huge cup of perennial ice
40
 for most of the year. There are two major 
reasons why the long Arctic summer
41
 does not melt the sea ice. Firstly, the sun in the 
region is always at a low angle in the sky, so there is a significantly small energetic 
input per unit area. Secondly, not all of the radiation that reaches the Earth is absorbed 
– some of it is reflected due to the albedo effect42. The rate of evaporation is much 
lower in comparison to tropical seas. Large Siberian and Canadians rivers bring fresh 
water into the Arctic Ocean, which than becomes part of the glaciers. The relief 
implies a limited connection and outflow to surrounding oceanic waters with higher 
salinity. Hence the Arctic sea ice has the lowest salinity among all oceans
43
 (Sale 
2008: 17). Some part of this ice is drifting, due either to local sea movements or to 
macro-drifts
44
.  
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 E.g. Gunnbjornsfjeld Peak, 3708 m (Greenland).  
39
 E.g. the Verkhoyanskiy Mountains (Siberia). 
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 I.e. ice that does not melt from season to season and is more than 2 years old.  
41
 Due to equatorial inclination the sun is visible at all times at the region for six months a year („Arctic 
summer‟), while for the other six months it does not rise above the horizon („Arctic winter‟). 
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 Darker surfaces absorb more of the incident radiation than the lighter ones. Dark soils absorb 90% of 
radiation and reflect only 10%. For the ice of the Greenland ice sheet these figures are reversed. Clouds 
also reflect radiation. As the low-level stratus dominates in the Arctic during summer, its albedo 
reaches 70% (Sale 2008: 73).  
43
 Although the Arctic Ocean has only about 1% of the earth‟s volume of sea-water, it receives around 
11% of the total freshwater input. 
44
 The Transpolar Drift, Polar Ice Current, Beaufort Gyre, and Siberian Ice Current.  
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Climate. The severity of climate varies across the region. It is coldest and 
driest in the areas that lie further from the influence of relatively warm waters of the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as the region‟s interior is very cold45. Also, during late 
winter and spring, storms occasionally bring warm air masses into the region from the 
south. The Eurasian seas differ substantially: while the Barents Sea has the mildest 
climate due to the influence of the North Atlantic Drift (the mean January temperature 
of air above is –10oC), the Kara Sea is much colder (–30oC, respectively). Some areas 
also remain ice-free during the summer, as the southern half of the Barents Sea, which 
is influenced by the North Atlantic drift; the Laptev Sea, which receives relatively 
warm fresh water from the Siberian rivers; or the Chukchi Sea, whose waters‟ 
temperatures are regulated by warmer water entering the Bering Strait.    
Svalbard is the warmest archipelago in the region thanks to the presence of the 
Norwegian Current. The mean annual temperature in Longyearbyen, Svalbard‟s main 
settlement, is –6oC. But inland areas, distanced from „favorable‟ maritime conditions, 
suffer from extremely low temperatures. The mean temperature at Gloermerniy 
Station (Severnaya Zemlya), 3500 km eastern to Svalbard, is –16oC. Similarly, the 
capital of Greenland, Nuuk, on the west coast of the island has a mean air temperature 
of –0.8oC, while that at Ittoqqortoormiit on the east coast is –6.4oC. The Siberian 
continental climate experiences higher wind speeds in winter than in summer, the 
result of which is that the latter are cool whilst the former are cold. In contrast, the 
Atlantic Arctic has a maritime climate. It is dominated by the North Atlantic Drift, 
which gives rise to cool winters and warm summers, even in the Franz Josef Land. As 
the northern Pacific is colder than the Atlantic, the area has higher wind speeds. 
Consequently, Alaska is generally cold in winter and warm in summer (Sale 2008: 
74). Within the Canadian Arctic, temperatures are relatively high near the southern tip 
of the Baffin Bay, as it is climatically similar to the Atlantic. However, moving north, 
temperatures decrease: while the mean annual temperature in Ikaluit is –9 oC, it drops 
to –20oC in Eureka on the Ellesmere Islands (Dowdeswell and Hambrey 2002: 65-8). 
 The Arctic is a cloudy region, especially during the summer when low-level 
stratus clouds dominate. The cloudiest area is the Atlantic Arctic (80 percent cover 
almost constantly throughout the year). In contrast, the sunniest places are inland 
Greenland, Alaska and the Canadian Arctic islands. Inland and maritime parts of the 
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 The lowest temperatures have been recorded at the North Ice station in Greenland,  –66.1 oC; and at 
Oymyakon in the Verkhoyanskiy region of north-east Siberia, –77.8 oC (Sale 2008: 75-6). 
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Arctic also have different roles in the hydrological cycle. Warm ocean currents bring 
heat and moisture to the air and frontal activity results in increased precipitation, 
usually in the form of snowfall, in the maritime areas. Again, it decreases as one 
moves north. Hence, southern Iceland, southern Alaska and parts of the Norwegian 
coast receive 3000 mm of precipitation each year, while inland areas with continental 
climates and lower temperatures receive less than 150 mm (NSIDC 2011: 1). The 
central Arctic basin is a polar desert – an area where the annual precipitation does not 
exceed 130 mm annually. 
A large portion of the region is underlain by permafrost
46
. Since snow 
provides insulation against the severe cold of winter, “topographic relief has major 
implications for vegetation distribution and nutrient cycling, and therefore for both 
plants and wildlife” (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 8). Regional vegetation includes a wide 
range of plant life with unique adaptations to the harsh climate: taiga forests of pine, 
spruce, willow, birch and poplar, flat tundra, steppe landscapes, wetlands, and cliffs 
fringed at their bases by rich vegetation fertilized over decades by the droppings of 
nesting seabirds.  
Fresh water exists in the Arctic in still, frozen, and running forms. When the 
massive glaciers of the ice age receded, a vast system of lakes and wetlands in 
depressions in the landscape emerged throughout the region
47
. Greenland glacier
48
 
and smaller glaciers in Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya, and Severnaya Zemlya 
store vast amounts of fresh water (Baldursson 2011: 3). The annual mean freshwater 
input of almost 40 percent to the Arctic Ocean is dominated by four rivers – the 
Mackenzie, Lena, Yenisei, and Ob. The total freshwater export from the Arctic Ocean 
to the North Atlantic is dominated by ships through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago 
and via the Fram Strait (Serreze et al. 2006: 1, 3). There is an interaction between the 
fresh water provided by the rivers, the existing sea water, and the melting ice within a 
large-scale freshwater cycle.  
Compared to other regions of the world, bio-diversity is low in the Arctic 
region; hence the relations between species
49
 are relatively simple. Also, mammals, 
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 Ground that does not thaw for two or more years, those thickness can reach up to 1000 m, as it does 
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birds and fish migrate to the Arctic in summer to feed and breed at the sea ice 
margins, coastal zones, estuaries and wetlands, and during the winter they go south
50
. 
At low altitudes the Arctic islands support rich flora. The flowering period is less than 
two months but it is enough for insects to emerge.  
Natural resources. The Arctic holds substantial reserves of hydrocarbons, base 
metals, precious materials, and radioactive elements. Approximately 61 large oil and 
natural gas fields have been discovered within the Arctic Circle in Siberia, Alaska, 
Canadian Northwest Territories, and the Northern Counties of Norway. 43 of the 61 
large Arctic fields are located in Russia (35 of these fields, 33 natural gas and 2 oil, 
are located in the West Siberian Basin). Of the 8 remaining large Russian fields, five 
are located in the Timan-Pechora Basin, two are in the South Barents Basin, and one 
is in the Ludlov Saddle. Among the 18 large Arctic fields outside Russia, 6 are in 
Alaska, 11 are in Canada‟s Northwest Territories, and one is in Norway (Budzik 
2009: 4). 
Some hydrocarbon deposits had already been discovered in the mid-20
th
 
century, such as the Prudhoe Bay field on the North Slope of Alaska, the northern part 
of the Norman Wells in the Mackenzie Delta in Canada, or the Tazovskoye field and 
Urengoy basin in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug in Russia. Other fields were 
not known until the late 1970s-1980s: the Sverdrup Basin, Melville Island, and Sabine 
Peninsula at Nunavut in Canada; the Norwegian Snohvit and Russian Shtokman fields 
in the Barents Sea; and the Nakhodka gas field in the Yamal Peninsula.   
In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) completed a quantitative 
assessment of undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources in 25 Arctic provinces 
north of the Arctic Circle. Scientists concluded that more than 70 percent of the 
undiscovered oil resources were estimated to occur in five provinces: Arctic Alaska, 
the Amerasia Basin, the East Greenland Rift Basins, the East Barents Basins, and 
West Greenland-East Canada; while more than 70 percent of the undiscovered natural 
gas was estimated to occur in three provinces, West Siberian Basin, East Barents 
Basins, and Arctic Alaska (see Appendix A, p. 93). It was further estimated that 
approximately 84 percent of the undiscovered oil and gas was to be found offshore. 
The total mean undiscovered conventional oil and gas resources of the Arctic were 
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estimated to be around 90 billion barrels of oil; 1669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, 
and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids (Bird et al. 2008: 4).  
Besides oil and gas, the following resources can be found in the region: coal in 
Norway, Greenland, and Russia; iron ore in Sweden, Finland, and Greenland; copper 
in Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Canada; nickel in Russia; silver in Sweden and 
Finland; lead in Sweden, Finland, Greenland, Alaska, and Canada; zinc in Sweden, 
Finland, Greenland, Alaska, and Canada; gold in Sweden, Finland, Greenland, Russia, 
Alaska, and Canada; platinum in Greenland and Russia; diamonds in Russia and 
Canada; uranium in Sweden and Greenland; molybdenum in Greenland; sand and 
gravel in Canada; and also tin, gemstones and apatite in Russia (Lindholt 2006: 30-5).  
As the Arctic region is a complex system, its physical environment is 
fundamentally interconnected with human-made constructs; while the former is 
extremely vulnerable to the human inputs (accidental and intentional), the latter are 
subject to the influence of the following variables: 
(a) Ice51; 
(b) Diverse relief and climate; 
(c) Unequal distribution of natural resources. 
3. 2. Military Space (S2) 
The United States and Russia, the main rivals of the Cold War, are immediate 
neighbors in the Arctic. Western Alaska and eastern Siberia are only 90 km apart at 
the Bering Strait, while the Bering Sea is essentially enclosed by the Russian and 
American territories (Osherenko and Young 1989: 17). The Arctic Ocean also 
separates the United States from Greenland and Norway; Canada from Greenland, 
Norway, and Russia; Greenland from Canada, United States, Russia, and Norway; 
Norway from Greenland, Canada, and the United States; and Russia from Canada and 
Greenland. Similarly, the shortest air route between the two countries is across the 
Arctic basin. 
Due to harsh physical conditions, exploration of the Arctic waters from the 
south has not been intensive in comparison with the penetration of other oceans. Until 
relatively recently, conventional military forces (i.e. ground forces, coast guards) 
were of little use in the polar climate. As the Arctic states did not expect a sudden 
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attack via the icy ocean
52
, they maintained a minimum military alignment consisting 
of local soldiers with „proper‟ equipment (skis and guns). So, for more than forty 
centuries
53
, the physical survival of the indigenous inhabitants had been the only 
security concern.  
In mid-20
th
 century, the rise of nuclear technology allowed the main rivals of 
the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, to utilize the region as the 
shortest air and maritime route for their nuclear long-range ballistic missiles and 
submarines. Consequently, throughout the postwar era the region has possessed “…an 
irreducible strategic significance” (Osherenko and Young 1989: 17). The logic of 
nuclear proliferation was based on, firstly, the realist concept of the balance of power 
and, secondly, the theory of deterrence. The former provided no room for cooperation 
between the great powers: “…the Arctic remained a critical theater of [military] 
operations… Security in the region was understood entirely in military terms” 
(Huebert 2004: 2). The latter implied: “when a parity relationship is combined with 
the enormous absolute costs of nuclear war, a deliberate (i.e. rational) war is at once 
unthinkable and virtually impossible…[Therefore] the nuclear balance is unusually 
robust and stable” (Zagare 1996: 368, 371).  
During the first decade of the 21
st
 century, the Arctic military space has 
inherited the Cold-War configuration. The United States and Russia continue 
believing that nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD) are the main 
mechanisms for maintaining international peace, and therefore routinely deploy 
nuclear warheads on their strategic submarines that transit the Arctic waters, and still 
use early warning systems to protect their territories (Erickson 2008: 6).  
Nodes. The seven Arctic states are the only nodes within the military space, as 
there is no room for either non-state or supranational actors. The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty
54
 implies: the United States and Russia are official nuclear states; 
while Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden are non-nuclear states (Zellen 
2009: 21). Equipped with the most destructive weapons, the United States and Russia 
are therefore more militarily-capable than their non-nuclear Arctic neighbors
55
.  
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The United States maintains numerous military installations in the region. 
Twenty long-range missile interceptors are positioned at Alaska as part of the North 
Warning System
56
 – the northernmost component of the Ballistic Missile Defense 
System, which integrates air-, land-, sea-, and space-based means of national defense. 
Two tandem satellites in the low earth orbit and the Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) Radar 
provide space tracking and surveillance of potential attacks of the ballistic missiles 
from across the Arctic Ocean. A significant portion of them patrols the waters of the 
Arctic Ocean. Located in Anchorage, the Alaskan Command (ALCOM) maintains air 
sovereignty, deploys forces for worldwide contingencies, provides support to federal 
and state authorities, and conducts joint training for the rapid deployment of ground 
forces. It consists of the 11
th
 Air Force (Elmendorf), the U.S. Army Alaska (Fort 
Richardson), and the U.S. Naval Force Alaska (Juneau). The U.S. Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM) is responsible for space operations (e.g. military satellites), 
information operations (e.g. information warfare), missile defense, intelligence, 
surveillance, and strategic deterrence. The offensive system consists of, first, 
prepositioned launch bases of ballistic missiles (located, however, outside of the 
Arctic Circle); and, second, 71 operating nuclear submarines (WNA 2010: 1). 
Nuclear-powered submarines are prone to aging
57
. Dismantling them has become one 
of the most expensive tasks for the U. S. Navy, as the reactors must be carefully 
recycled. 
Canada hosts 11 long-range and 36 short-range radar centers of the North 
Warning System. Its permanent military presence in the Arctic consists of 
headquarters in Yellowknife, an air transport squadron of 35 Otter aircrafts, and 
communication center at the Canadian Forces Station Alert on Ellesmere Island. 
However, the country does not have an operational airbase in the region (Smol 2009: 
4). Recently, Canada launched the construction of a new training centre at Resolute 
Bay and a military port at Baffin Island. The Canadian Navy consists of the Maritime 
Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), based in Nova Scotia and responsible for the control of 
the eastern part of the Canadian Arctic; and the Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPAC), 
based in British Columbia and responsible for the control of the western part of the 
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Canadian Arctic. Also, the aboriginal peoples participate in the Canadian Forces 
Northern Area (CFNA). They conduct patrols and operations in the North, train the 
youth, and work with local communities (Lackenbauer 2007: 5).  
Despite recent calls for greater autonomy of Greenland, Denmark is still 
responsible for the defense of the island. Island Command Greenland maintains and 
enforces maritime sovereignty. The Coast Guard, which carries out search and rescue 
operations, is also under Danish command, though staffed largely by the local 
population. The Royal Danish Navy operates a Sirius Sledge Patrol in Daneborg. The 
United States Air Force‟s northernmost overseas possession, Thule Air Base, is also 
located on the eastern side of Greenland. The country does not possess nuclear 
weapons.    
Finland controls its northern territories with the Army and the Air Force, as 
the Archipelago Sea and Gulf of Finland maritime commands do not have direct 
access to the Arctic Ocean. The northern military province is equipped with a highly 
mobile field army, and backed up by local defense units. Based at Rovaniemi, the 
Lapland Air Command is responsible for protection of the airspace of northern 
Finland with F-18 Hornet fighters. The country does not possess nuclear weapons.  
Norwegian military force is comprised of the Army, the Royal Navy 
(including Coastal Rangers and Coast Guard), the Royal Air Force, and the Home 
Guard. Several military bases are located within the Arctic Circle. Bodø Main Air 
Station, the largest air force base in Norway, lies just north of it. The base is operated 
by the Royal Norwegian Air Force and is home to the General Dynamics F-16 
Fighting Falcons and Westland Sea King helicopters of the 330
th
, 331
st
, and the 332
nd
 
Squadrons
58
. It also hosts the Norwegian Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System 
(NASAMS), and an air force training base. The main naval base, Haakonsvern, is 
located south of 66° 33' northern latitude, but the Trondenes fort (main base for the 
Norwegian Coastal Ranger Command), Tjeldsund base (secondary base for the 
Norwegian Maritime Special Forces Unit), and the Brigade Nord (regular Army) are 
located within the Arctic Circle. There are also four sites with prepositioned United 
States‟ equipment (DoD 2004:63). The country does not possess nuclear weapons. 
Despite its longstanding national policy of non-alignment, Sweden maintains a 
permanent, well-armed and well-equipped army and air force presence in the Arctic –  
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two full-sized regiments with regular soldiers, reservists, and conscripts; and a 
garrison consisting of artillery, mechanized infantry, tanks, and special forces (Smol 
2009: 3). There is a specialized battalion of the ground forces in Norrbotten County, 
while the Arctic Rangers units of the 22
nd
 Infantry Regiment in Kiruna provide 
training in unconventional warfare and guerilla tactics in polar conditions. A 
permanent Arctic air base is located at Lulea, less than 200 km south from the Arctic 
Circle. Lulea is the home port of the icebreaker armada, which allows sea traffic to 
continue at a virtually unchanged rate during the winter. Sweden lacks direct maritime 
access to the Arctic Ocean. The country does not possess nuclear weapons. 
The Russian military control over, and defense of, the region is realized 
primarily with ballistic missiles. By the end of 2011, 24 satellites of the Glonass 
system – an ambitious attempt to maintain sovereignty through satellite navigation – 
should come into full operation. The main function of the Russian Strategic Rocket 
Forces (SRF) is similar to that of the American USSTRATCOM: to defend Russia‟s 
territory from an attack, and attack an enemy‟s offensive nuclear weapons, military 
facilities, and infrastructure. The total arsenal of the SRF includes 369 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, including 171 SS-25 Topol missiles and 67 SS-27 
Topol-M missiles (Podvig 2010: 27). Russian ground-based intercontinental and 
intermediate-range nuclear missiles can easily reach the coastal areas of North 
America via the Arctic Ocean. The Northern Fleet is another way of controlling the 
region: virtually all of Russia‟s largest naval bases are located within the Arctic 
Circle. The largest base is located on the Kola Peninsula, and support bases stretch 
from Murmansk to Archangelsk. The country relies on eight strategic submarines and 
13 nuclear-powered attack submarines. By 2015, eight new submarines are planned to 
be constructed. The question of proper reactor dismantling remains open, as about 
200 submarines are now retired, and 40 of them remain stored afloat indefinitely at 
Severodvinsk, in close proximity to the Arctic Circle (WNA 2010: 2). Their reactors 
have not been recycled properly, and nuclear waste has been leaking into the waters 
of the Arctic Ocean, posing great harm to the ecosystem. Although ground forces are 
extensive (and active) in other sub-regions of Russia, they do not serve as the primary 
means of maintaining military control in the Arctic, mainly due to the lack of 
infrastructure and the harsh climate. Therefore, Russia‟s military presence in the 
region is misbalanced in favor of non-conventional weaponry.  
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Links. The seven nodes of the Arctic military space (the Arctic states) do not 
exist in a vacuum. They are connected via the links of participation in certain 
international military institutions. The four main channels of military communication 
existing between the Arctic states are: NATO, OSCE, NORDCAPS, and NORAD. 
However, these channels have different intensities, as alliance preferences differ 
among the Arctic states.    
The United States, Canada, Greenland, and Norway share a long-standing 
relationship – all are members of NATO. Their militaries conduct joint exercises and 
operations on a regular basis, as they participate in collective defense whereby, 
according to Article 5 of the Charter, member states agree to provide defense to each 
other in response to an attack by an external party. Due to military neutrality, neither 
Finland nor Sweden are members of NATO. Russia is not, and cannot be, a member 
of NATO, as acts as a balance against the absolute dominance of NATO in the Arctic 
region (as well as in other regions). Despite the existence of the NATO-Russia 
Council, military establishments within NATO members are still suspicious of 
Russia, and vice versa.    
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the 
second channel of military cooperation between all Arctic states. It deals with three 
dimensions of security – politico-military, economico-environmental, and human – 
and is the “…primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis 
management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in its area.” (Knell 2008: 21). However, 
decisions are politically, but not legally, binding, as the “…[OSCE] offers the region 
a forum for political dialogue and negotiations and a platform for multilateral 
partnerships that pursue practical work on the ground” (OSCE 2011: 1).  
The third channel of military cooperation is the Nordic Coordinated 
Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS) which exists between 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark. The organization strives to adapt and 
further develop Nordic cooperation within the area of military peace support 
operations (PSO), utilizing the proven ability of Nordic military interaction and 
enhancing the Nordic profile in such operations, in order to achieve more beneficial 
efforts to support international peace and security (NORDCAPS 2010: 1). 
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is the fourth, 
bilateral channel of military cooperation in the Arctic region. It provides aerospace 
warning, air sovereignty, and defense for the entire territories of Canada and the 
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United States, including the Arctic region. Its bi-national command is manned by 
American and Canadian soldiers. Within this framework, the militaries of both 
countries are able to communicate on Arctic matters through the inter-institutional 
dialog between the Alaska NORAD Region (ANR), based at Elmendorf air base; and 
the Canadian NORAD Region, located in Manitoba.         
As international diplomacy is based on the principle of reciprocity, a matrix of 
symmetrical relationships showing intensity can be constructed, according to three 
levels of cooperation: „shallow integration‟ (one-channel link), „moderate integration‟ 
(two-channel link), and „deep integration‟ (three-channel link) (see Appendix B, p. 
95). The analysis has shown that military integration is shallow between Canada and 
Finland, Canada and Russia, Denmark and Russia, Finland and Russia, Norway and 
Russia, Canada and Sweden, Russia and Sweden, Finland and the United States, 
Russia and the United States, Sweden and the United States (OSCE-only). Integration 
is moderate intensive between Canada and Denmark, Canada and Norway, Denmark 
and the United States, Norway and the United States (OSCE and NATO); Denmark 
and Finland, Finland and Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Finland and Sweden, 
Norway and Sweden (OSCE and NORDCAPS). Military integration is deep between 
Denmark and Norway (OSCE, NATO, and NORDCAPS), and between Canada and 
the United States (OSCE, NATO, and NORAD). Consequently, Russia is the least 
integrated into the regional military framework, in contrast to Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, and the United States. 
Until recently, the military space has been the most developed human-
constructed geostrategic space of the Arctic. It is primarily defined by: 
(a) Buffer position; 
(b) The legacy of the Cold War (nuclear arsenals); 
(c) The seven Arctic states as the only nodes;  
(d) The varying intensity of the relationships between the nodes.  
3. 3. Economic Space (S3) 
 According to Gail Osherenko and Oran Young,  
Though the Arctic may never emerge as a great center of 
manufacturing industries, the region is destined to become a 
major source of raw materials of critical importance to advanced 
industrial societies both in the Arctic rim states and in other 
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Northeern Hemisphere states like Japan and Korea (Osherenko 
and Young 1989: 45).  
The modern Arctic economic space consists of two economies, subsistence 
and global. The subsistence economies of Arctic sub-regions exhibit features of the 
least-developed economies, as they tend “…to become monocultures oriented toward 
the supply of raw materials to industries located elsewhere” (Young 1992: 222). Apart 
from very limited employment by national resource extractions companies, 
indigenous populations are typically involved in subsistence activities, such as 
reindeer herding, fishing, hunting, and farming. Among all native peoples of the 
Arctic, European Sami people and Canadian Inuits are the most advanced in terms of 
inclusion into the national economies: while the former are widely present in small-
scale and handicraft industries, the latter have gone even further by entering the 
construction, tourism, and administrative sectors (Knell 2008: 31). In contrast, 
Russian people of the North are the least economically-included in all Arctic states.        
The global economy penetrates the region from the south, mainly with 
resource extraction companies, their supply chains, elements of infrastructure, etc. 
Hydrocarbon and mineral resources, the main interests of these profit-makers, are 
subject to cyclic economic activity. As the profitability of Arctic extraction depends 
on the worldwide supply and demand of oil, it ceases to be profitable when oil prices 
per barrel drop below $100. When this occurs, economic activity slows down (Knell 
2008: 32). The cyclic nature of the global trade in hydrocarbons is, in fact, very 
damaging to the subsistence economies of the Arctic, as, instead of satisfying the 
basic needs of indigenous populations, the latter is simply a supplement to the former. 
In Alaska, for example, 10 000 Inuit living in the North Slope Borough receive “…the 
bulk of [their] $98 million budget each year from taxing onshore oil operations” 
(Mouawad 2007: C10). However, $98 million can quickly be diminished to $40 
million, without any influence by Arctic sub-regions themselves, but due to the shifts 
in global economy.  
The Eurasian and North American parts of the Arctic differ in the level of 
economic development and the internal linkages. Finland, Sweden, and Norway have 
the highest shares of secondary (non-extractive) industries and fairly low shares of 
extractive industries (not exceeding 5-10 percent of regional GDP), and an advanced 
network of infrastructure. In contrast, the American and Russian Arctic economies are 
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strongly mineral-based, and Greenland‟s economy is based on the fishing industry. 
Their infrastructure is not developed sufficiently to allow balanced economic growth.    
Nodes. In contrast to the Arctic military space (S2), the region‟s economic 
space is more open towards non-state actors
59
. However, despite the fact that revenues 
of multi-national corporations are huge, they are still subject to national sovereignty. 
Hence, the seven jurisdictions of the Arctic states are the ultimate nodes of the Arctic 
economic space. Appendix C (p. 96) illustrates the activities in nature-based sectors in 
the Arctic economic regions.  
The Alaskan economy, which constitutes 3 percent of US GDP, is resource-
based; primary industries (petroleum, minerals, seafood, timber, and seafood, and 
tourism) account for approximately 85 percent of Alaska‟s GDP. Prudhoe Bay, the 
largest petroleum-producing province, generates almost 40 percent of total income tax 
in the region. Natural resources are extracted on-shore and off-shore, and are 
generally shipped out of the state for processing, although there is limited production 
of seafood
60
 and petroleum. Zinc accounts for over 50 percent of all mineral 
production in the region, followed by gold and lead (16 and 10 percent, respectively). 
There is minor production of coal, and virtually all the output of the mining sector is 
exported. Secondary industries, which include manufacturing and processing, 
contribute only 8 percent to GDP; due to the limited infrastructure and the distance 
from major American and foreign markets. Natural gas, hydropower, petroleum, and 
coal are the primary sources of electric power. Agriculture and forestry play a 
negligible role in the Alaskan economy. The private sector is twice as large as the 
public, constituting 46 percent of GDP. Pipeline transportation, for example, 
generates almost 7 percent to Alaska‟s GDP. Thanks to a long-term trend in growth, 
tourism already employs 60 percent more people than the petroleum industry. 
However, tourism is a highly seasonal activity. International airfreight is a rapidly 
increasing service industry. Cargo operations continue to expand at the Anchorage 
Airport and in Fairbanks – potential transit points connecting Asian manufacture-
intense economies (Chinese, Malaysians, and Vietnamese) and European and North 
American consumers (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 42-5).  
As of 2006, the Canadian North (Northwest Territories, Yukon and Nunavut) 
generated 0.5 percent of the state‟s GDP. Similarly to Alaska, mining and 
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hydrocarbons extraction are the major economic activities in the region in terms of 
gross production value: they account for 36 percent of total economic activity. Even 
though on-shore oil and gas extraction has been continually declining since 2001, the 
majority of already extracted crude oil is shipped to Ontario, and most of the natural 
gas is shipped to British Columbia. Fossil fuels are used as the primary energy 
resources. Public administration and defense is the second largest industry – it 
generates 17 percent of GDP, followed by mining (13.2 percent), as all of the 
diamonds currently mined in Canada are from the Northwest Territories. Financial 
services (including insurance) constitute the third largest sector of the Canadian 
Arctic economy, followed by construction (11 percent of regional GDP). In contrast 
to the Western part of the Canadian Arctic (whereas there is no significant fishing 
activities), the waters of the Central and Eastern Canadian archipelagos are home to 
capelin, cod, herring, halibut, shrimp, and snow crab. Nevertheless, fishing and 
agriculture are not significant contributors to regional GDP. Tourism is a small but 
steadily expanding sector. So far, underdeveloped infrastructure slows down 
economic growth; transportation involves „ice‟ roads, while the Northwest Passage is 
still jurisdictionally disputed (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 46-8).  
In fact, Russia is “…the only Arctic state that has established a true northern 
economy” (Knell 2008: 31) because, after discovering significant deposits of natural 
gas, oil, and minerals in the vast regions of Western and Eastern Siberia in late 1940s, 
the Soviet Union managed to construct and operationalize the Northern Sea Route 
(NSR) along all its Arctic coasts, from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait. Either 
during the ice-free time of the year, or with help of ice-breakers, NSR allows, among 
others, transport of raw materials (timber, minerals) to Arkhangelsk and Murmansk; 
and equipment and other supplies to northern parts of Central and Eastern Siberia. 
Currently, in terms of “…production, output, manpower, number of settlements, 
geographical scope of activity, and composition and range of activities, the NSR and 
its adjacent land territories are the most pronounced exploitation areas in the whole of 
the Arctic” (Ostreng 1999: 3). As of 2006, the fuel industry, including oil and gas 
extraction, was the largest single industry in the Russian Arctic (36 percent of 
regional GDP). Roughly 55 percent of Russian oil is from Khanty-Mansi, and more 
than 85 percent of Russian natural gas is from Yamalo-Nenets. GDP per capita in 
both sub-regions is considerably higher than in other parts of the Russian Arctic (in 
fact, the second highest after the Moscow region). As a consequence of planned 
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public industry development, resource extraction and processing have to a large 
extent been organized in vertically-integrated state-owned companies (Gazprom, 
SibNeft, Lukoil) which produce multiple outputs. Electricity is mainly produced from 
fossil fuels (approximately 65 percent). Transportation of petroleum via pipelines 
generates an additional 7 percent of regional GDP. Chemical industries, as well as 
ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy industries are relatively small (just 4 percent of 
regional GDP). 2 percent of the world‟s coal extraction takes place in the Russian 
Arctic (Lindholt 2006: 94). In comparison to other Arctic regions, the share of private 
and public services in the Russian Arctic is low. Tourism is significantly 
underdeveloped (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 59-60).  
The Arctic part of Finland generates approximately 11 per cent of national 
GDP. North Ostrobothnia is the largest economic sub-region, even though Lapland 
covers almost two thirds of Arctic Finland. Since there is no hydrocarbon extraction 
or production, mining (e.g. iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, gold) is only 7 percent 
of GDP. Even though the overall value added of mining is small in Arctic Finland, the 
chromite mine in Lapland is the base of the third largest stainless steel plant in the 
World. Nuclear energy, wood fuel, oil, coal, (imported) natural gas, and hydropower 
are the main sources of electric energy. Public services contribute about 22 percent to 
regional GDP. The largest manufacturing industry is electronics (contributing 39 
percent of the value added and 24 percent of the total employment of Northern 
Finland). The extensive processing industries consume more than 80 percent of the 
electricity generated in the region. Agriculture (crops and livestock) is not well-
developed, as it generates only 2 percent of regional GDP. As of 2006, tourism 
accounted for almost one quarter of the value added of private services. Lapland and 
Kainuu are especially popular destinations in the winter (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 
2006: 51-2). An extensive network of roads and railroads
61
 allows a relatively steady 
economic development throughout the Finnish Arctic. 
The two northern counties of Sweden (Vasterbotten and Norrbotten) account 
for slightly less than 5 percent of the total GDP of Sweden. The largest resource 
sectors are forestry (timber) and mining (iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, gold, silver, 
uranium). Hydropower is the primary source of electricity. There is no significant 
fishing activity in Sweden. Besides public and private services, the largest industry is 
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manufacturing (15 percent of regional GDP). Real estate (renting and business 
service) generates about 14 percent of GDP. Health and social work contribute an 
additional 10 percent. Tourism generates almost 3 percent of Gross National Product 
(GNP). An extensive network of roads and railroads
62
 allows relatively steady 
economic development throughout the Swedish Arctic (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 
62).  
The largest part of the Norwegian Arctic economy is made up of education, 
health, and social work, followed by public administration and defense. The fishing 
industry, which is considered to be a core element of the Norwegian economy, 
generates only 3.7 percent of regional GDP; however, these numbers seem to be 
underestimated
63
. As of 2006, on-shore production of oil and natural gas was low; 
however, there are several off-shore deposits of hydrocarbons. Coal is mined mainly 
on Svalbard. Currently, a natural gas field is being developed north of Hammerfest, so 
that in the near future it will be liquefied (LNG) and exported by sea, since the warm 
Norwegian Current keeps the southern part of the Barents Sea ice-free throughout the 
year. Electricity is generated by hydro- and wind-power stations. In contrast to the 
agricultural sector (which produces less than 1 percent of regional GDP), tourism is 
the largest industry among the nature-based industries, both in terms of value added 
and employment. It generates approximately 60 percent more income than the fishing 
industry. The wildlife on Svalbard is the main tourist attraction. An extensive network 
of roads and railroads allows a relatively steady economic development throughout 
the Norwegian Arctic (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 57-8).  
Although on-shore oil and gas extraction in Greenland is shrinking, fishing 
(with cold-water shrimps as the most important species
64
) turns out to be the largest 
industry (18 percent of regional GDP), followed by education, health, and social work 
(16 percent). Individual quotas in combination with other Home Rule [Dannish] 
regulations exist in fisheries. Cod fisheries are now of minor economic value, due to 
decline of the resource base. The agricultural sector (especially sheep husbandry) is 
slowly expanding due to the warming climate. Hydropower is the primary source of 
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 Part of the Trans-European Road Network (TERN) – the biggest infrastructure project of the EU. 
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 Fish is harvested by fishing companies with headquarters in the southern part of Norway. 
Consequently, part of the income from fishing in northern waters may be registered as income in the 
South of Norway. 
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electricity. There has recently been a marked increase in the exploration of gold, 
nickel and diamonds, and molybdenum. The government is the largest employer in 
Greenland (43.5 percent of total employment in Greenland). The second largest sector 
in terms of employment is retail trade (11 percent), and fish processing (8 percent). In 
contrast to the Scandinavian states, the tourist sector in Greenland is still 
underdeveloped. But, since recently, it is considered to have potential for further 
growth (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 53-4). 
The European Union is an important external node (actor), as five out of seven 
of the Arctic states‟ economies are significantly tied to the European common market. 
As of 2009, 46 percent of Russia‟s exports went to the EU, as did 55 percent of 
Denmark‟s, 67 percent of Norway‟s, 52 percent of Sweden‟s, and 25 percent of 
Finland‟s exports (DG Trade 2010: 3; CIA 2011:1).  
Links. Seven links of varying intensity exist between the Arctic states: the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Group of Eight (G-8), the European Union 
(EU), the European Economic Area (EEA), the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), the Nordic Council, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA).  
Except for Russia, all Arctic states are members of the WTO
65
. WTO 
members trade with each other according to several principles: non-discrimination 
(consisting of the Most Favored Nation
66
 rule (MFN) and the national treatment 
policy
67
), reciprocity, binding and enforceable commitments
68
, and transparency. 
Member states bind themselves to grant significant reduction of tariffs to other 
member states
69
. As WTO membership is legally-binding, intra-regional trade is 
diverted against the organization‟s only regional non-member: Russia.  
Canada, Russia, and the United States are members of the G-8. The heads of 
the G-8 states meet annually to discuss major economic issues. Ministerial meetings 
are attended by lower-ranking ministers as needed throughout the year. The recent 
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 The United States granted a Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status to all Arctic states, 
except Russia. 
66
 The MFN rule requires a WTO member to apply the same conditions on all trade with other WTO 
members (this measure deals with tariffs). 
67
 Imported goods should be treated no less favorably than domestically produced goods (this measure 
deals with technical and security barriers to trade).  
68
 Ability to invoke the WTO dispute settlement procedure. 
69
 The Uruguay negotiation round, which led to the creation of WTO, extended the range of reduced 
tariffs and agricultural subsidies to approximately 40 percent, and a major extension of intellectual 
property rights.    
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agenda for the meetings included macroeconomic management, trade, and relations 
with developing countries (Knell 2008: 28). Even though the G-8 framework provides 
avenue to discuss major international issues and set priorities for economic policy, it 
is not institutionalized. If any decision is taken during the G-8 meetings, they are not, 
per se, legally-binding. Consequently, intra-regional trade is not diverted against non-
G-8 states – Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.   
Finland, Sweden, and Denmark
70
 are members of the EU. They participate in 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), so their monetary policies are fully 
coordinated by common institutions. The three countries share a single market with 
other EU member states (with no tariffs or quotas), and enjoy the free movement of 
four production factors (people, goods, services, and money). Of those three, only 
Finland has adopted the Euro as the basic currency. As a member of EFTA, Norway 
participates in the European Economic Area (EEA), which allows the country to 
participate in the EU common market without assuming the full responsibilities of EU 
membership (EEAS 2011: 1). Despite trade in agriculture and fisheries, which are not 
part of the EEA Agreement, Norway trades with EU member states without tariffs. 
EFTA membership is legally-binding; intra-regional trade becomes diverted against 
non-EEA members – Canada, Russia, and the United States. 
The United States and Canada are members of NAFTA, a complex free trade 
regime, which dismantles all visible barriers to trade (tariffs and quotas), and includes 
some elements of a common market
71
. The two countries remain sovereign over 
external tariffs, technical norms, and border controls. NAFTA membership is legally-
binding; intra-regional trade becomes diverted against non-members – Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Russia.  
Previously a parliamentary body and currently a regional economic forum, the 
Nordic Council connects Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The Northern 
states communicate via the committee on Business and Industry, which “…deals with 
frameworks and parameters for the economy, production, and trade, including free 
movement in the markets and in the labor markets of Nordic countries” (Knell 2008: 
30). However, the Nordic Council is a non-institutionalized integration channel: if any 
decisions appear during the annual Session, they are not, per se, legally-binding. 
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 In 1985 Greenland, unlike Denmark, left the European Economic Community (EEC). However, EU 
law still largely regulates the foreign trade of Greenland.  
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 Advanced cooperation in capital and labor markets, common regional policy, etc.   
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Consequently, intra-regional trade is not diverted against non-members of the Nordic 
Council – Canada, Russia, and the United States.  
The PCA connects Russia and the EU member states, i.e. Denmark, Finland, 
and Sweden. The PCA is a preferential trade agreement, which is based on the 
principle of the lowest common denominator. It allows partial tariff reduction in 
goods and services within several sector agreements
72
 (Cihelková 2003: 627). Heads 
of state, parliamentarians, ministers-in-charge, and senior experts of the four Arctic 
states meet on a regular basis to discuss specific trade issues (Valko 2010: 62). The 
agreement is legally-binding, but intra-regional trade does not divert against Canada, 
Norway, or the United States, as tariff reductions between non-signatories of PCA 
and the EU exceed those granted by the PCA. Finally, the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC), an intergovernmental forum that connects the European Union with 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Denmark, has several specialized working 
groups
73
 promoting harmonization among national economic legislatures. However, 
according to international law, BEAC decisions are non-binding. Despite recent 
growth in bilateral trade, Russia and Norway account for an insignificant part of of 
each other‟ foreign trade,74 and both countries are not yet connected via any 
international agreement
75
 (NRCC 2011: 1). 
International trade operates according to the principle of reciprocity. A matrix 
of symmetrical relationship showing intensity permits the distinction between four 
levels of economic cooperation: „shallow integration‟ (one-channel link), „moderate 
integration‟ (two-channel link), „deep integration‟ (three-channel link), and „extra 
deep integration‟ (four-channel) (see Appendix D, p. 97). The matrix indicates that 
economic integration is shallow between Canada and Denmark, Canada and Finland, 
Canada and Norway, Canada and Sweden, Denmark and the United States, Finland 
and the United States, Norway and the United States, Sweden and the United States 
(WTO), and between Canada and Russia, and Russia and the United States (G-8). 
Economic integration is moderate between Denmark and Russia, Finland and Russia, 
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 Textile Agreement, Steel Agreement, Science and Technology Agreement, Nuclear Safety and 
Nuclear Fusion Agreement, Fisheries Cooperation Agreement.  
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 Working Group on Economic Cooperation (WGEC), Working Group on Customs Cooperation 
(WGCC), and Committee for the Barents Euro-Arctic Transport Area (BEATA).  
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 Sweden, Denmark, and Finland are ahead of Norway by their foreign trade with Russia. 
75
 Norway is a member of the European Free Trade Association. This organization does not have any 
comprehensive trade agreement with Russia. So far, negotiations are in a feasibility study phase (EFTA 
2011: 1).  
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Russia and Sweden (PCA, BEAC), and deep between Canada and the United States 
(NAFTA, WTO, G-8). Integration is the deepest between Denmark and Finland, 
Denmark and Sweden, Finland and Sweden (BEAC, EU, WTO, Nordic Council); and 
between Denmark and Norway, Finland and Norway, Sweden and Norway (BEAC, 
EEA, WTO, Nordic Council).    
The gradually-expanding Arctic economic space can be characterized by:  
(a) The existence of two economies, subsistence and global;  
(b) Strong influence of an external actor, the European Union; 
(c) Disparity in economic development and internal linkages; 
(d) Disparity in the intensity of linkages between the nodes. 
3. 4. Demographic space (S4) 
The Arctic is home to some four million inhabitants. Approximately one third 
of this population lives in indigenous communities, and two thirds are newcomers 
(Ahlenius et al. 2010: 14). Similarly to the case of the Arctic economic space, there 
are two social systems in the Arctic demographic space: indigenous and modern.  
Indigenous communities are usually small and remote, i.e. dispersed 
throughout the vast landmasses of the northernmost regions of the Arctic states. Their 
lifestyle is still based on the two most important subsistence resources: 
reindeer/caribou systems (on land) and sea mammals (in coastal areas). Social 
scientists and lawyers often describe them as belonging to the „Fourth World‟ 
composed of “indigenous peoples who are locked into nations they can never hope to 
rule” (Osherenko and Young 1989: 72). In general, they do not have access to the 
range of social services, available to people living in the more densely populated 
southern regions of the world. Very often they suffer from inadequate housing, 
energy, water and transportation systems; limited economic opportunities; and 
underfunded and culturally-insensitive education systems (Zellen 2009: 92). Due to 
the lack of healthcare, infectious and chronic diseases (diabetes, cancer, heart attack, 
and stroke) and health problems such as alcoholism, drug abuse, and suicide are the 
most frequent causes of death among the Arctic populations (Knell 2008: 40). Infant 
mortality is several times higher for indigenous peoples than for the general 
population of the Arctic states (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 21).  
Modern community is not bound to the Arctic ecosystem, but has emerged 
near the regional centers of economic activity. It consists of agglomerations of non-
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indigenous people who have migrated from the southern parts of the Arctic states 
during the second half of the 20
th
 century to extract, process, and transport natural 
resources, as well as to provide related private and public services.  
Nodes. Both indigenous and non-indigenous agglomerations within the Arctic 
Circle constitute the nodes of Arctic demographics. As in the case of the economic 
space, they are subject to the jurisdiction of the seven Arctic states. Almost two 
million people live in the Russian Arctic (1.4 percent of the total population), with 
indigenous northerners forming less than 10 percent of this number
76
. Murmansk, 
Severomorsk, Monchegorsk, Severodvinsk, Kandalaksha, Apatity, Vorkuta, Pechora, 
Salekhard, Novy Urengoi, Norilsk, Talnah, and Kajerkan are the main agglomerates 
of the Russian Arctic. Russia has not ratified the ILO Convention 169 of 1989
77
. 
Consequently, even though the literacy rate reaches 99 percent, indigenous 
northerners are displaced, as their social system is inconsistent with their culture and 
lifestyle. The sharpest example is the Kola Peninsula, whose native inhabitants, the 
Sami, “…have been gradually forced off fertile tundra grazing land and away from 
the shores of the Barents Sea into artificially created towns” (Knell 2008: 38). Today 
there are just 1 600 Sami left in Russia, and the majority is unemployed, as “…they 
do not have a land settlement claim arrangement with the Russian government that 
would grant them a share in the oil and gas, industry, and forestry profits” (Ibid.). In 
contrast, those working for modern extraction, production, and transport of natural 
resources receive higher salaries and wider social services, than the rest of the 
country. 
Among the 649 000 people living in Arctic Alaska (0.2 percent of the total 
population), the indigenous population constitutes almost 20 percent
78
. Fairbanks is 
the largest agglomerate within the Arctic Circle. The literacy rate reaches 99 percent. 
The ILO Convention 169 of 1989 has not been yet ratified. Hence, international law 
does not recognize the indigenous people as „separate‟ nations. The majority of 
Alaska‟s land is owned and managed by the federal and state governments. According 
to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 12 regional, and dozens of local, Native 
corporations are entitled to ownership of only one-tenth of the state (WSD 2007: 1). 
According to the 2005-2007 American Community Survey, almost 85 percent of the 
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 Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. 
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people speak only English at home. Less than 6 percent of Alaskans speak one of the 
states‟ 22 indigenous languages. All Aboriginal languages lack official language 
status. Education, social, and health systems are not adjusted to the needs of the 
indigenous inhabitants. Consequently, the latter are excluded from modern American 
society (Ahlenius et al. 2010: 16). 
Among the 380 000 people living in Arctic Norway (10.2 percent of the total 
population), the indigenous inhabitants constitute approximately 10 percent
79
. Tromso 
and Bodo are the main settlements. The literacy rate reaches 99 percent. Norway has 
ratified the ILO Convention 169 of 1989, hence the Saami are recognized as an 
indigenous people. Since 1989, they have had their own national Sami Parliament 
(elected by and amongst the Saami), and special rights to reindeer husbandry. „Siidas‟ 
are the main organizations for Saami representation in state institutions. Moreover, 
the Saami and Norwegian languages have equal standing. So, the Norwegian 
indigenous population is not socially-excluded, in comparison to Russia or the United 
States.   
200 000 people live in Arctic Finland (3.6 percent of the total population), of 
which the Saami constitute less than 4 percent. Rovaniemi is the main settlement. The 
literacy rate reaches 99 percent. The Saami are recognized as „people‟ by the national 
government. The Finnish Saami Parliament has existed since 1973, but the ILO 
Convention 169 of 1989 has not yet been ratified. The Saami have had limited access 
to native language instruction (in some schools), after the establishment of language 
rights in 1992. Finland has denied any aboriginal or land rights to the Saami people, 
as non-Saami can herd reindeer as well. Consequently, Finnish indigenous inhabitants 
are partially excluded from modern society. 
Of the 264 000 people who live in Arctic Sweden (2.9 percent of the total 
population), 5 percent belong to the Saami communities. Kiruna is the largest 
settlement. The literacy rate reaches 99 percent. The Saami are recognized as „people‟ 
by the national government. The Swedish Saami Parliament has existed since 1993, 
but the ILO Convention 169 of 1989 has not yet been ratified. „Siidas‟ are the main 
organizations for Saami representation in state institutions. Saami pupils have the 
right to be taught in their native language, however, this legislation is often breached, 
as no suitable teachers are available. In addition, the current legislation technically 
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bans speaking in a language other than Swedish in the workplace. Hence, Swedish 
indigenous inhabitants are partially excluded from modern society. 
Among the 57 700 people living in Greenland, the Kalaallit Inuit constitute the 
majority (76 percent or 50 000 people). Thule is the largest settlement within the 
Arctic Circle. The literacy rate reaches 99 percent. Since 1979, Greenland has been an 
autonomous country governed by Denmark, with a local parliament and full control of 
health care, education, and social services. In 1996, the country ratified the ILO 
Convention 169 of 1989, so Greenlanders have also been recognized as a separate 
group of people under international law. The 2008 referendum gave indigenous 
people control over the police force, coastguard, and courts; and Greenlandic became 
the sole official language of the island. Hence, indigenous inhabitants are not 
excluded from the modern society, in contrast to other Arctic states. 
The Inuit constitute an absolute majority in the Canadian Arctic – 85 percent 
or almost 600 000 people (0.4 percent of total population of Canada). Yellowknife is 
the largest settlement. The ILO Convention 169 of 1989 has not yet been ratified. 
Hence, international law does not recognize the indigenous people as „separate‟ 
nations. However, the Aboriginal Right to Self-Government policy implies that the 
Inuit have the constitutional right to shape their own forms of government, while the 
Health Transfer policy guarantees Aboriginal peoples the right to control health 
services via the National Aboriginal Health Organization (NAHO). In 1999 the 
Nunavut federal territory was officially separated from the Northwest Territories. 
Apart from English and French, the Official Languages Act recognizes nine 
Aboriginal languages of the Canadian Arctic
80
, despite the fact that the policy does 
not address the education system. The literacy rate reaches 99 percent. Hence, the 
Canadian Inuit are still partially excluded from modern society. 
The European Union is an important external actor, as it has launched two 
initiatives aimed at improving the health and social well-being of the Arctic 
indigenous inhabitants. On the one hand, the Partnership in Public Health and Social 
Well-Being (NDPHS), helps the Arctic states to reduce the spread of diseases in their 
northernmost regions. The Barents Health Cooperation Program (BHCP), on the other 
hand, contributes to the general improvement of the Arctic states‟ health systems 
(Knell 2008: 36).  
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Links. All Arctic states are permanent members of the Arctic Council (AC), 
which strives to address issues faced by all Arctic governments and the indigenous 
people. One of six working groups of the AC, focusing on the living conditions of the 
Arctic residents, allows the experts to communicate on a daily basis, to prepare 
agenda for bi-annual meetings of ambassadors and senior foreign ministry officials of 
the Arctic states. However, the AC is an intergovernmental forum; hence the 
conclusions of these meetings are not legally-binding under international law.  The 
Arctic states‟ indigenous communities are linked via participation in five out of six81 
indigenous networks that have Permanent Participant (PP) status
82
 on the Arctic 
Council. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) connects all Alaskan, Canadian, 
Greenlander, and Russian Inuit communities (approximately 160 000 people). It aims 
at promoting Inuit rights on the international level; ensuring and developing Inuit 
culture; and stimulating the political, economic, and social inclusion of Inuit into 
modern resource-economies (ICC 2011: 1). The Gwich‟in Council International 
(GCI) connects all Canadian and Alaskan Gwich'in communities (approximately 
9 000 people). It has two primary tasks: firstly, to ensure that Gwich‟in agglomerates 
are represented at the AC, and, second, to “…play an active and significant role in the 
development of policies that relate to the Circumpolar Arctic” (GCI 2011: 1). The 
Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) connects all Canadian and Alaskan Athabaskan 
communities (approximately 40 000 people). It aims at defending the rights and 
international interests of Americans and Canadians of Athabaskan origin; and 
“…fostering a greater understanding of the shared heritage of Athabaskan peoples of 
Arctic North America” (AAC 2011: 1). The Saami Council (SAAMI), connecting all 
Finnish, Russian, Norwegian, and Swedish Saami communities (approximately 
120 000 people) into a non-governmental organization, has been actively dealing with 
relevant policy tasks: promotion of Saami interests on the international arena; 
recognition of the Saami as a nation; maintenance of economic, social and cultural 
rights of the Saami in the legislation of the four states (SC 2011: 1). The Aleut 
International Association (AIA), connecting Alaskan and Russian Aleut communities 
(approximately 18 000 people), was formed by the Aleutian/Pribilof Islands 
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Association (the U. S.), and the Association of the Indigenous Peoples of the North of 
the Aleut District of the Kamchatka Region, of the Russian Federation (AIPNADKR). 
It aims at addressing environmental and cultural concerns of the Aleut “…those well-
being has been connected to the rich resources of the Bering Sea” (AIA 2011: 1).  
A matrix of symmetrical relationships, showing intensity, allows the 
distinction between four levels of demographic cooperation: „shallow integration‟ 
(one-channel link – AC-only), „moderate integration‟ (two-channel link – AC plus 
one), „deep integration‟ (three-channel link – AC plus two), and „extra deep 
integration‟ (four-channel link – AC plus three) (see Appendix E, p. 98). International 
social dialog between Canada and Finland, Canada and Norway, Canada and Sweden, 
Denmark and Finland, Denmark and Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Finland and the 
United States, Norway and the United States, Sweden and the United States is 
shallow, as it is limited to the AC. A moderate level of integration exists between 
Canada and Denmark, Russia and Canada, Denmark and Russia, Denmark and the 
United States (AC plus ICC); Finland and Norway, Russia and Finland, Finland and 
Sweden, Norway and Russia, Norway and Sweden, Russia and Sweden (AC plus 
SAAMI). Integration between Russia and the United States is deep, as three channels 
of communication exist between them (AC, AIA, and ICC). Finally, Canada and the 
United States are connected via four channels (AC, AIA, ICC, and GCI). This link is, 
therefore, the deepest of all links between the Arctic social nodes.   
Scientific research on the climate change also links the nodes within the 
demographic space, as, since 2000, the number of scientific exchanges between 
Arctic states (especially between Canada, Russia, Norway, and the United States) has 
been steadily increasing. This channel should not be underestimated, as it may have a 
considerable impact on the regional political relations
83
.    
The Arctic demographic space can be characterized by:  
(a) Two social spaces, indigenous and modern; 
(b) Disparity in the level of social inclusion: social services are better for 
those indigenous inhabitants, who have settled land claims with their 
respective governments; 
(c) Indigenous and non-indigenous Arctic agglomerations as the nodes;  
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(d) Strong influence of an external actor, the European Union.  
(e) Disparity in the intensity of linkages between the nodes.  
3. 5. Information space (S5) 
All Arctic states dispose of information systems sufficient to their needs, as 
“…all states have national broadcast, Internet, magazine, newspaper, and press 
agency capabilities” (Knell 2008: 55). Throughout the Arctic Circle, at least one local 
media outlet – television, radio, or newspaper – is available. But, according to Knell, 
“…although some [Arctic] states show strong information systems, and even the 
weaker states are adequate, there is no real Arctic information system” (Knell 2008: 
54).  
Indigenous and non-indigenous communities within the Arctic Circle, the 
nodes of the information space, fall under the jurisdiction of the seven Arctic states. 
In fact, communications are designed to run north-south, and not within the region 
itself. Since, with the exception of the Internet, there is no inter-region information 
exchange, no links between the nodes can be identified.   
Canada is well-equipped with information technologies; 53 percent of the 
population use main phone lines, while 67 percent rely on cell phones. Phone 
connection is provided by a domestic satellite system with almost 300 earth stations, 
submarine cables (linked to the United States and Europe), and 7 international 
satellite earth stations (6 over the Atlantic Ocean and 1 over the Pacific Ocean). CBC 
North offers northerners one local television channel and one local radio station, 
broadcast in English, French, and, for few hours per day, Inuktitut. The only local 
newspaper is published in English. Approximately 27 million people are active users 
of the internet (79 percent of the population) (CIA 2011: 1).  
Greenland is the only Arctic state in which less than 50 percent of the 
population has access to main line phones and less than 75 percent to cellular phone 
communications. Phone connections are provided by the operation of 15 satellite 
earth stations (all over the Atlantic Ocean). Print, radio and television media reflect 
north-south ties, as they are in Danish. However, one national and one local 
newspaper are published in Kalaallisut. Recently, a few private local television and 
radio stations have started broadcasting. 36 000 Greenlanders are internet users 
(roughly 55 percent of the population) (ibid.).   
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The modern Finnish communications network is advanced: while 33 percent 
of people use fixed phone lines; cellular mobile phones connect almost 80 percent of 
the population. Phone connections are provided via digital fiber-optic fixed-lines, 
submarine cables, and one satellite earth station
84
. Since 2008, all television signals 
have become digital. Public broadcasting consists of 13 national and 25 local 
television and radio stations – all in Finnish. The only local newspaper in Lapland is 
also in Finnish. Almost 4.5 million people are active users of internet (roughly 80 
percent of the population) (ibid.).  
Approximately 46 percent of Norwegians use main phone lines, while 87 
percent rely on cellular phone communications. In most cases, the latter are the only 
possibility in the rural and northernmost provinces. Phone connections are operated 
by buried coaxial cable systems, submarine cables, and three satellite earth stations
85
. 
There is one local television station and one local radio station which broadcast in 
Norwegian, one local newspaper in Norwegian, and one local newspaper in Saami. 
Almost 95 percent of Norwegians (including those living north of the Arctic Circle) 
are users of internet (4.4 million people) (ibid.).  
Among all Arctic states‟ provinces, information technology is least developed 
in Russia‟s northern republics, oblasts, and autonomous okrugs. Only 32 percent of 
Russians use main phone lines, but almost 85 percent rely on cellular mobile phones. 
The telephone system operates via cross-country digital trunk lines run from Saint 
Petersburg to Khabarovsk, and from Moscow to Novorossiysk; digital telephone 
systems; analog and digital cellular services; undersea fiber-optic cables; and four 
satellite earth stations. However, in rural areas, including the Arctic region, the phone 
services are still outdated and inadequate. There are roughly 3 300 federal, regional, 
and local television channels; and 2 400 public and commercial radio stations. All 
broadcast in Russian. The Sakha, Karelia, and Arkhangel regions have only local 
newspapers (all in Russian) but no local television or radio stations. The Murmansk, 
Yamalo-Nenets, and Krasnoyarsk regions have mainly newspaper outlets, again in 
Russian. Less than 20 percent of the people living in the Russian North use the 
internet (ibid.).     
                                                        
84
 Shared with Sweden, Finland, and Denmark.  
85
 Norway shares the Inmarsat earth station with the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden).  
54 
 
The Swedish Arctic is the most advanced in terms of information. As of 2000, 
Sweden had “the highest number of phone lines (fixed and mobile) per capita, as well 
as the highest percentage of Internet users in the world” (Knell 2008: 55). In 2006, the 
government launched a broadband internet network in Norbotten
86
. Over 93 percent 
of the region now has access to broadband, and all schools in Norbotten are connected 
to the internet. Within the Arctic Circle, there are two local television and two local 
radio stations that broadcast in Swedish, one local radio station that broadcasts in 
Saami and Swedish, and six local newspapers that are printed in Swedish. As of 2009, 
88 percent of population was users of the internet (approximately 8.3 million people) 
(ibid.). 
Residents of Alaska are not as advanced in information technologies as those 
from the rest of the country. For example, although there is a post office in Nuiqsut
87
, 
no FM radio signal, or daily newspaper, is available within nearly 200 km (Knell 
2008: 58). More than 50 percent of the Alaskan population uses main phone lines, and 
slightly over 60 percent rely on cellular phone communication. Phone connections are 
realized via a large system of fiber-optic cables, microwave radio relays, coaxial 
cables, multiple ocean cable systems, and 65 satellite earth stations (49 over the 
Atlantic Ocean and 16 over the Pacific Ocean). The State of Alaska owns two local 
television stations and one local newspaper, all broadcast or printed in English. As of 
2009, approximately 62 percent of the Alaskan population used the internet on a daily 
basis (ibid.).  
 The Arctic information space can be characterized by:  
(a) Sparse population disconnect; 
(b) Reliance on cellular phone capabilities; 
(c) Scandinavian strength and Russian backwardness. 
3. 6. Merging Five Geostrategic Action Spaces into a System 
The five geostrategic action spaces (S1-S5) do not exist in vacuum. Apart from 
being influenced by their surroundings (i.e. by external players/domestic politics), 
they are also constantly influenced by each other. The spaces are, in fact, components 
of the complex geostrategic system of the Arctic. Changes in one space transform the 
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other spaces, and the effects are non-linear. Ten possible channels of inter-space 
effect are illustrated in Figure 4.  
It is obvious that human-constructed spaces (S2-S5) are not capable of 
constructing the physical space
88
. In contrast, certain elements of the physical 
environment determine the overall shape and internal organization of the human-
made spaces (S2-S5). In his book on the history of the wealth and poverty of nations, 
Harvard professor David Landes
89
 highlights how physical conditions in the tropics 
represent significant barriers to economic development. He did not consider the Polar 
Regions; but the Arctic physical space can be generally seen as an even bigger 
challenge to livelihood than the tropics (Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006: 41).  
Figure 4: Ten Possible Channels of Inter-Space Affection 
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First, the buffer position of the Arctic region implies a high level of 
militarization, as Russia and the NATO members still perceive each other with a 
certain suspicion (in line with the Cold-War rhetoric). Despite the transitive 
tendencies of the region (e.g. the ice cover melt), the location effect is constant, as the 
distance between the Arctic states is fixed. Besides, as Arctic climatic conditions are 
harsh, the utility of using different types of weaponry varies. The region‟s ice cover is 
a direct challenge to the ability of Arctic states to deploy ground forces and military 
infrastructure effectively. With the exception of Sweden, where limited polar-guerilla 
training is realized, all other states rely ultimately on the means of air and naval 
power, with ballistic missiles (positioned in strategic bombers/submarines and 
equipped with nuclear weapons) remaining the most reliable means of power 
projection. In fact, it is easier for the NATO members to rely on the United States‟ 
nuclear defense shield (NWS) than to develop their own ground forces of limited 
efficiency. The efficiency of air power depends on the distribution of clouds 
throughout the region. It suits Western Greenland, the Canadian Arctic, and Alaska; 
but it is almost useless around the Atlantic Ocean. The efficiency of naval power also 
varies due to the differences in the physical environment. Some parts of the ocean 
remain ice-free throughout the year due to the presence of warm currents, so the 
maritime Nordic states are able to use naval vessels more efficiently than continental 
Russia, as the mobility of the latter is seriously slowed by the need to use ice-
breakers. In such cases, submarines remain the only effective naval means of military 
power projection.   
 Second, the Arctic physical space presents a number of hazards
90
 to economic 
activity on land and in the waters near the coastlines and around the islands.   
The presence of natural resources establishes two economies: subsistence and global. 
The former, serving to satisfy the basic needs of indigenous inhabitants, depends on 
regional bio-diversity, which is, in turn, defined by climate. The latter is challenged 
by the high costs of Arctic drilling. At the same time, many known mineral and 
hydrocarbon reserves are not exploited because of their inaccessibility (Lindholt 
2006: 30). The unequal distribution of natural resources defines the sector distribution 
of Arctic economies: it allows some countries to benefit more from the extraction, 
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production and transit of oil, gas and minerals (Canada, Russia, the United States); 
while others are based on fishing (Greenland) or services (Nordic countries). In 
general, the operation and shipping costs of doing business in the Arctic are 
considerable, particularly in terms of labor, maintenance, repairs, and insurance 
(Boult 2004: 6). Assuming the longest production chain, labor-intensive manufactures 
are especially vulnerable to changes in the physical environment.  
 Third, the region‟s physical environment shapes the lifestyle of indigenous 
and non-indigenous inhabitants. Due to low bio-diversity, reindeer/caribou and sea 
mammals remain the most important subsistence resources for indigenous peoples 
(Ahlenius 2010: 17). The seasonal movements of both species directly affect the level 
of food supply and distribution of inter-communal material flows. The lifestyle is 
adapted to the condition of a constant search for energy (heat). Being less dependent 
on the local ecosystem, non-indigenous agglomerations still suffer from seasonal 
climatic changes. In winter, when energy consumption is at its maximum, some social 
services become unaffordable
91
 to low-income population groups. Moreover, during 
snowstorms, transport infrastructure is often paralyzed, thus the more remote 
settlements are disconnected from the social services of larger agglomerations.  
Fourth, the Arctic information space is affected by the physical environment. 
Due to challenging climatic conditions, surface communication lines are limited. In 
terms of general connectivity, countries with mild maritime climates (Nordic states, 
Alaska, Eastern Greenland) are more advanced than those with a harsh continental 
climate (Russia, Canada, Western Greenland). Due to the existence of a deep basin, it 
is not technically possible to run submarine communication lines on the ocean floor 
through the entire North Pole. In fact, despite certain limitedness in the cloudy areas, 
satellites remain the only effective mean of broadcasting.  
Fifth, the intensive military use of the Arctic during the Cold War makes its 
modern inhabitants face the danger of nuclear waste. All Russian Arctic 
agglomerations with populations above 200 000 people (Murmansk, Archangelsk, 
Novodvinsk, Severomorsk, Novy Urengoi) suffer from radioactive materials buried 
below the surface of the adjacent Novaya Zemlya – the result of a total of 132 nuclear 
tests conducted by the Soviet Union between 1955 and 1990 (Sale 2008: 604). The 
United States has also carried out some nuclear tests on Amchitka Island (Aleutians), 
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and trace radioactive materials were placed in locations around the site. Hence, the 
entire Alaskan territory, including the area within the Arctic Circle, faces increased 
levels of radiation, as do the majority of abandoned U.S. military stations in 
Greenland
92
. The toxic waste causes numerous health problems,
93
 further pressuring 
the Arctic states‟ social welfare systems.        
Sixth, the gradually expanding economic space seeks constant military 
justification of the national sovereignty rights of all Arctic states, since the latter is the 
primary means of the manifestation of political power. The ongoing militarization of 
the resource-rich Arctic regions of Canada, Russia, and the United States follows the 
pattern of the increasing economic presence of these countries in the region. The 
synergy of economic power and military power is visible in all Arctic states‟ regional 
strategies, as all of them stress that a continued military presence is essential for 
securing national interests in the region. For example, Russia “…highlights the need 
to make necessary preparations for the security challenges that may derive from the 
expected increase in economic activities in the Arctic” (Zysk 2010: 107).  
Seventh, the economic space affects the demographic space. The existence of 
two economies: subsistence and global, implies the presence of two social systems, 
indigenous and modern. Moreover, the difference between the two economic systems 
reflects more or less accurately the difference between the two social systems. The 
earnings of people who participate in the global economy (i.e. work in resource-, 
capital-, and labor-intensive industries) are many times higher than those coming in 
the subsistence economy. Consequently, non-indigenous inhabitants may afford 
themselves better social services than their indigenous neighbors. Levels of social 
inclusion are, therefore, directly dependent on economic conditions.     
Eighth, the Arctic information space affects the economic space. The 
availability of internet and an adequate supply of financial and postal services lead to 
a significant trade formation. The gravity model of trade says that a greater distance 
between two countries reduces their bilateral trade (Volbert and Von Furstenberg 
2004: 12, 69). The availability of information technologies has the potential to reduce 
this distance „virtually‟, as even remote areas can participate in the exchange of goods 
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and services.
94
 Hence, trade is promoted by technological advancement (e.g. Nordic 
states), and slowed by technological backwardness (e.g. Russia).    
Ninth, the information space influences the military space. Similarly to the 
previous example, the advancement of information technology is beneficial to the 
Arctic states, as it allows greater mobility for their national security forces. 
Communication is exceptionally important in the polar region, as it may, at least 
partially, compensate for the technical military limitations posed by the vast size of 
territories and harsh climatic conditions. For instance, due to this inter-space 
relationship, Russia and the European Union have been developing the Glonass and 
Galileo projects. Their goal is to achieve „information sovereignty‟ from the 
American GPS. This virtual sovereignty automatically implies real military 
independence. 
Tenth, the information space affects the demographic space. The Arctic states 
rely on several satellite systems to transmit digital television and radio, and to provide 
the regional communities with broadband internet access. By allowing “…easy two-
way communication within the Northern communities, among communities, and with 
people worldwide” (Christopher and Fast 2008: 2) the latter stimulates the 
acceleration of the process of social inclusion among indigenous, and even non-
indigenous, populations.
95
 Consequently, the effect of advances in information 
technology over living standards is directly proportional.      
These are only primary channels of inter-space effects. Less obvious links of 
systemic interdependence exist between the five Arctic geostrategic spaces, as well as 
secondary, tertiary and higher-order derivative effects. However, this work aims at 
offering a hint at the nature of the system‟s complexity. The presentation of all 
internal interconnections within the Arctic transborder region is left for later research.  
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4. The System’s Dynamics  
An assessment of the individual components of the Arctic transborder region 
has demonstrated that the region‟s five geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) are not 
autonomous. On the contrary, they are constantly affected by each other and the 
system‟s surroundings. This section aims at demonstrating that these spaces are not 
static. In fact, given the transitive nature of the region
96
, the five geostrategic spaces 
(S1-S5) are in constant flux, in terms of both the physical environment and human 
activity. In other words, the system is dynamic. So far, “…[it] is at a fork in the road 
between its two potential directions” (Knell 2008: 65). It can either become an area of 
conflict over the quest for vast natural resources and disputed territories, or an area of 
cooperation, with states securing their national interests within the scope of 
international law and regional integration frameworks.  
The ultimate goal of this section is to predict which scenario will prevail in 
future.
97
 Prior to the prediction itself, the forces that strengthen the system‟s stability 
(physical environment, Cold War alliances, and post-Cold War normalization of 
relations), and weaken the system‟s stability (climate change and the melting of the 
Arctic ice cap; unequal distribution of underwater topographical relief, climate and 
natural resources; unsettled territorial disputes; unbalanced security relations; 
consolidation of indigenous communities, and isolation of Russia), are demonstrated. 
Finally, Lawson W. Brigham‟s four “Scenarios for 2040” (“Globalized Frontier”, 
“Adaptive Frontier”, “Fortress Frontier”, and “Equitable Frontier”) are applied to the 
interplay of these forces.  
4. 1. Forces Strengthening the System’s Stability 
Physical environment. Apart from the change of climate and the melting of the 
Arctic ice (whose disturbing effects will be discussed in Section 4.2) there are certain 
elements of the physical geography which hold the current system together: the lowest 
atmospheric temperature on Earth due to the highest latitude; the existence of the 
„Arctic day‟ and „Arctic night‟, with the sun rising and not rising above the horizon for 
six months a year, respectively; the presence of polar lights (e.g. the aurora borealis) 
and sound effects (e.g. the acoustical mirages) between 60 and 72 degrees north 
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latitude; etc. The modern Arctic states are used to these conditions while organizing 
their military, economic, and demographic spaces. Despite the potential change of 
climate, it is unlikely that these characteristics will disappear in future.  
Cold War alliances. The Soviet Union was the first Arctic state to launch the 
economic development of the Arctic. In the 1930s, it began systematically investing in 
infrastructure to develop the Northern Sea Route (NSR). In the late 1940s, the 
discovery of hydrocarbon reserves spurred further industrialization of the region, given 
the political attractiveness of Arctic resources
98
; since, during the Cold War, the North 
American Arctic was controlled by the United States and Canada, the western part of 
Eurasian Arctic was controlled by the United States‟ allies, and the Eastern part of 
Eurasian Arctic was under the control of the Soviet Union. Hence, both Cold War 
rivals could proceed with the exploitation of Arctic resources “…in an atmosphere of 
relative security and political predictability” (Osherenko and Young 1989: 45). In fact, 
this condition is still valid.  
The mainstream logic of political science implies that the system of 
international relations is generally stabilized by long-term alliances, but only if the 
latter are led by an evident player (Krejčí 2007: 359). The alliances that emerged 
during the Cold War within the Western and Eastern blocs fit perfectly this definition: 
the conflict‟s major antagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, provided 
other states with ideological and material benefits for joining either camp. Alliances 
tend to gain international influence over time (ibid.): the longer an alliance lasts, the 
lower the probability is of a political dispute among its participants, because it may 
risk a long-standing relationship (Knell 2008: 13-14).  
This logic still applies to the modern Arctic system: its nodes do interact with 
each other via certain institutionalized links – both those created during the Cold War, 
and those which emerged after its end. Cold War coalitions are still effective. For 
example, Canada, Greenland (Denmark), Norway, and the United States are all 
members of NATO, and thus “they [still] share the success of Cold War cooperation 
that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union” (Knell 2008: 13-14). The participating 
states have managed to harmonize their military practices by conducting common 
operations and exercises. Military cooperation is further strengthened by the 
NORDCAPS and NORAD frameworks. Since at least four out of seven Arctic states 
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are connected by strong military ties, the system‟s stability is strengthened (in contrast 
to a situation where no military alliance exists, all Arctic states follow the strategy of 
„one-against-all‟).   
Similarly, the system‟s stability is promoted by non-military Cold War- 
alliances. The economies of three Arctic states (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) are 
fundamentally interconnected via the European common market, with its own 
standardized legal system.
99
 Norway indirectly participates in the project via the EEA. 
European integration is further promoted by the Nordic Council. It is highly unlikely 
that these states would allow any dispute (including over issues related to the Arctic 
region) to danger their membership in the European Union – the deepest regional 
integration that has ever existing on the political map of the world. Besides, WTO 
membership has legally-binding implications for all Arctic states except Russia.
100
 
Similarly, NAFTA interconnects the economies of Canada and the United States.   
The subjective side of geopolitics matters: as long as the governments of the 
Arctic states perceive each other through the lenses of Cold War-politics  – i.e. rely on 
Cold War geopolitical representations („mental maps‟) – the system will remain stable, 
as all its nodes prefer to maintain the status quo. This reasoning inherits the experience 
of multiple games of chicken
101
 between the rivals at times of bipolar confrontation. 
As a result, the Arctic states believe in each other‟s rationality and their own ability to 
predict the behavior of their counterparts. Although the latter is subject to scientific 
criticism,
102
 the modern Arctic system is still strengthened by the existence of long-
term alliances between at least some nodes. 
Post-Cold War normalization of relations. Prior to the end of the Cold War, 
the United Nations has been the only international organization connecting all Arctic 
states. The United States and the Soviet Union are Permanent Members of the Security 
Council. As the latter “…alone ha[d] the power to take decisions which Member 
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States [had been] obligated to carry out”103 (UN 2011: 1), Americans and Soviets were 
able to define the nature of diplomacy in the region.  
The relations between the rivals started to normalize with the end of the Cold 
War. New bilateral and multilateral incentives have emerged with the objective of 
uniting all Arctic states under a common intra-regional framework. In contrast to the 
alliances left over from the Cold War, new incentives have so far, proven shallow. For 
example, although the NATO-Russia Council allows bilateral dialog on an equal basis, 
a dispute resolution mechanism is missing. Similarly, although BEAC connects the 
European Union with Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia, and Denmark; its decisions 
are not legally-binding. Finally, although the Arctic Council has been successful in 
creating a dialog between the Arctic states‟ governments and indigenous communities 
of the North, its decisions are not legally-binding.  
Nevertheless, the limitedness of the modern channels of intra-regional 
cooperation does not imply that they would not be overcome in future. Depending on 
the existence of common objectives, it is the responsibility of the Arctic states‟ 
„goodwill‟ to change the quality of the relationship (i.e. to make the decisions of the 
NATO-Russia Council, BEAC, and the Arctic Council legally-binding). 
Consequently, even young and shallow attempts at integration strengthen the stability 
of the Arctic system, as even modest types of coordination among nations “foster 
relationships that may ease tensions during a critical time period” (Knell 2008: 17). 
Therefore, the system gains the ability to absorb an internal shock.  
4. 2. Forces Weakening the System’s Stability 
Climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice cap. Resent scientific research 
has revealed the staggering pace of climate change in the region:  
In early 2008, new NASA satellite data has led its researchers to predict an ice-
free summer Arctic in less than five years [i.e. in 2013] … The surface area of 
Arctic summer ice shrunk 23 percent below the previous minimum record … 
Surface temperatures in the Arctic Ocean during the summer were the highest 
in seventy-seven years of record-keeping (Gunitskiy 2008: 263).      
This process constitutes the system‟s positive feedback mechanism. When the 
ice melts, heat from the sun is fully absorbed by the ocean, instead of being reflected 
off the white surface and back into space. This further speeds up the warming of the 
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ocean waters and, consequently, leads to even more ice melting. According to Knell, 
throughout centuries, the system‟s self-regulation had allowed for relatively consistent 
levels of ice, as the system‟s negative feedback (via “flywheel” and “gateways”)104 
had been compensating for seasonal increases in temperature (Knell 2008: 9). The 
recent melting of the ice strengthens the positive feedback without strengthening the 
negative feedback, so a fragile balance between the two is altered.   
The intra-regional effects of climate change are numerous. Firstly, the physical 
space (S1) is being transformed. Among others, the atmospheric circulation patterns 
are changing, exposure to storms is increasing, coastal erosion is widening (Ahlenius 
et al. 2010: 33), and the existing shape of the region‟s ecosystem is being altered. 
Plants are starting to grow more vigorously and densely (AMAP 2009: 5). On the one 
hand, species that are dependent on the current climate (e.g. polar bears and seals) are 
becoming extinct, while the number of incidents wherein large numbers of walruses 
come ashore has been steadily growing (Gunitskiy 2008: 263). At the same time, as 
the region warms up, “the probability of the introduction of invasive species through, 
for example, the dumping of ballast water from other regions as well as oil spills” 
(Ahlenius et al. 2010: 34). Appendix F (p. 99) illustrates the selected indicators of 
change.   
Secondly, the change of climate also fuels the transformation of the human-
constructed spaces (S2-S5). If the Arctic icecap continues to shrink, the region will 
soon become more navigable and more accessible (Holmes 2008: 324). The shape of 
the existing military space (S2) will be altered significantly by the change of climate, 
as ice-free waters of the ocean and shrinking permafrost on land will allow the 
development of new ground and naval capabilities (regular forces and warships), while 
retaining the existing ones (submarines and ballistic missiles). In terms of economic 
space (S3), the melting of the Arctic ice can introduce significant changes. As the two 
trans-continental waterways, the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, 
would open up, oil transport would increase, coastal development would accelerate, 
and new regions would become open for mining, fishing and other economic 
activities. Knell adds that, as the warming of the region is not equally distributed, so 
some Arctic states can begin extracting resources in areas that have been previously 
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been considered economically inefficient sooner than others (Knell 2008: 60). Finally, 
the demographic space (S4) will react accordingly to the change in the Arctic 
economic regions. The development of infrastructure would, on the one hand, provide 
a stimulus to the process of urbanization and advancement in the social services 
available; but, on the other hand, the reduction in sea ice is very likely to have 
devastating consequences for local people for whom animals are a primary food 
source (EPA 2011: 1). Finally, the warming of the region would allow the region to be 
supplied with advancements in information technology at a lesser cost; so the 
information space (S5) will also be affected by the change of climate.  
Consequently, climate change will affect all physical and human-constructed 
aspects of the Arctic. As the melting of the region‟s icecap accelerates in time, this 
process challenges directly the current state of affairs in the region (status quo). The 
system‟s stability is therefore weakened, and “…the region is exposed to more risk” 
(Knell 2008: 60).   
Unequal distribution of underwater topographical relief, climate and natural 
resources. As highlighted in Section 3.1, territories within the Arctic Circle are not 
geographically-homogeneous. Some areas are colder; others are cloudier; and some 
contain certain natural resources which are absent in other regions. In terms of 
international law, such distribution implies certain discrimination. Upon ratification of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a coastal state has 
ten years to claim an extended continental shelf, which would provide exclusive rights 
to resources above or below the seabed of that extended shelf area (see Appendix G, p. 
100). The deep basin is not part of the framework. In other words, due to the seabed‟s 
topographical relief, Russia is about to gain sovereignty rights over almost half of the 
Arctic Ocean, i.e. much more than its North American counterparts.
105
 The unequal 
distribution of relief and climate implies certain military advancement of some Arctic 
states. For example, Robert Jervis claims that the effectiveness of air power is 
seriously limited in cloudier areas, e.g. in Central Europe. In fact, this claim is also 
true for the northernmost region (Jervis 2010b: 1). Consequently, in contrast to West 
Siberia, the Atlantic Arctic is a bad candidate for effective air surveillance. Favorable 
climate conditions are also facilitators of industrial and social development, as the cost 
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of developing infrastructure and information technologies decreases with the rise in 
temperature. For example, due to the relatively warm Norwegian Current, population 
density is highest on the Scandinavian Peninsula. Besides, a differentiated depth of the 
ocean may affect, among others, the character of the region‟s traffic and economic 
activity. 
As relief, climate and natural resources are not equally distributed within the 
Arctic Circle; some states feel physically-discriminated by their regional counterparts 
under the status quo. In contrast, they prefer to push the system into a transition that 
would, potentially, allow them to acquire a larger share of the region‟s natural wealth. 
However, as the nodes of the human-constructed action spaces (S2-S5) are not able to 
influence the internal organization within the physical space (S1), they try to act via 
politics. This produces a conflict of interests within the system, weakening its stability.  
Besides, as some regions of the Arctic are based on the extraction of natural 
resources, they become vulnerable to oil and gas price fluctuations, the danger of 
technical (infrastructure) shut-downs
106
, and political decisions made at the national 
level. Non-energy resources are also subject to global, not regional, demand. Finally, 
multinational oil and gas corporations also contribute to the tension in the region 
through their competitive nature and business practices. Since they earn a lot of 
money, they are able to influence the politics of six Arctic states, and, in the case of 
Russia and Norway, compete with government-controlled Gazprom and Statoil (Knell 
2008: 18-19).  
Unsettled territorial disputes. The existing border delimitation provides room 
for the further scramble for the Arctic region, as the Arctic states actively explore their 
northern territories in search of factual justification for their territorial claims: the 
Northwest Passage (Canada vs. the United States), border delimitation in the Beaufort 
Sea (Canada vs. the United States), Hans Island (Canada vs. Denmark) and, until 
recently, the „Grey Zone‟ in the Barents Sea (Norway vs. Russia) (see Appendix G, p. 
100).  
Despite the existence of several councils that address the rights of indigenous 
populations, preservation of marine life, etc.; there is no deep, region-specific 
integration framework that would have jurisdiction over addressing the territorial 
claims, boundary and passage disputes. The Arctic states have to solve the issues 
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either bilaterally, multilaterally, or, if they have signed UNCLOS, submit them to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, or 
United Nations Special Arbitration (Knell 2008: 17). Hence, as a common mechanism 
for conflict resolution is missing, the overall system becomes less resistant to internal 
shock.  
Unbalanced security relations. So far, the Arctic military space (S2) is still 
governed in the spirit of the conflict between the Western and Eastern blocs. Knell 
highlights that “…[although] in some ways and for some states, this legacy has 
positive effects, such as the Arctic-based Russian naval capability… In other ways and 
for other states, this legacy has negative effects, such as a limited capacity for security 
due to reliance on an alliance” (Knell 2008: 20). He also points out that “…although 
Cold War alliances proved beneficial overall, some decisions made during that time 
are now vulnerabilities in the Arctic military system” (Knell 2008: 24). The author 
refers to the case of the Nordic countries:  
As these states were able to maintain relatively small militaries despite 
the near Soviet threat because they were relying on the United States to 
become immediately involved if they were attacked. One state, Iceland, 
completely relied on alliances and never established a military at all. 
With a significant number of U.S. forces now returned back to the 
continental U.S. from Europe, and the U.S. focus in the Middle East, 
these Nordic militaries may not be large enough to guarantee security if 
the Russian threat reemerges (ibid.). 
 
Intra-regional security cooperation is still limited to a NATO-Russia dialog. 
Because “…historically, NATO member states have almost never undertaken a major 
security initiative without at least the tacit acquiescence of the U.S.” (Wallace and 
Staples 2010: 10), Norway, Denmark and Canada rely on the American Arctic 
strategy. In January 2009, the outgoing President Bush signed the Arctic policy 
directive, which has remained valid under President Obama. Firstly, it recognizes the 
ongoing reliance on conventional military power in the region. Secondly, it establishes 
three conditions for American support of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ), since 
there is a lack of nuclear balance among the Arctic states – while the United States and 
Russia are nuclear states; Canada, Norway and Denmark are non-nuclear states (Zellen 
2009: 21). In fact, these conditions have emerged as the real obstacles to the 
denuclearization of the region (see Table 3, p. 68). 
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Table 3: Three Conditions of American Support of NWFZ 
Condition 1 The content of a NWFZ Treaty should not disturb the existing security 
arrangements or interfere with the rights of individual/collective self-
defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. 
Condition 2
  
A Zone should not affect the rights of the parties under international law 
to grant/deny transit privileges, including port calls and over-flights. 
Condition 3 
  
No restrictions should be imposed on the high seas freedom of 
navigation and over-flights by military aircraft, the right of innocent 
passage through archipelagic seas, and the right of transit passage 
through international straits. 
Source: Wallace and Staples 2010: 10-11. 
Condition 1 directly challenges the idea of Arctic denuclearization due to 
NATO members‟ adherence to the Strategic Concept and, specifically, to Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty.
107
 Condition 2 is problematic because transit rights are 
allowed only to ships and aircrafts not carrying nuclear weapons, which is in conflict 
with the long-standing American policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of 
nuclear warheads on board its ships and aircrafts. Finally, Condition 3 is also 
problematic due to the ongoing United States-Canada dispute on the legal status of the 
Northwest Passage. Russia‟s approach is clearly modern (realist). In 2008, President 
Medvedev signed Russia‟s Arctic Policy until 2020, which clearly recognized the 
ongoing strategic relevance of the Arctic region to the Russian security agenda. 
Although there was no clear reference to the ongoing reliance on nuclear weapons, 
there is still explicit support for the Freedom of the Sea Doctrine, which, in fact, 
allows nuclear submarines in the high seas. Similarly to the American counterpart, 
Russia is to continue relying on the nuclear deterrent as the ultimate source of strategic 
parity with the United States (Medvedev 2008: 4-6). 
  The problem therefore extends beyond regional security concerns to the very 
nature of nuclear non-proliferation measures. In particular, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty
108
 is responsible for a significant „imbalance of obligations‟: “...the non-
nuclear-weapons status is immediate, legally binding and internationally verifiable and 
enforceable... But the commitment of nuclear-weapons-states to disarm is neither 
timetabled, nor precise, nor binding” (Thakur 1997: 7). It is therefore unlikely that 
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 Article 5 of the Washington Treaty says that the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them shall be considered an attack against them all. Consequently, if such an armed attack 
occurs, each of them will assist the Party or Parties attacked, including the use of armed force, to restore 
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
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 Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty stipulates that non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) give up 
the nuclear option in return for nuclear disarmament by nuclear-weapons states (NWS). 
69 
 
either Americans or Russians would de-militarize the region, or declare any part of 
their northern territories free of nuclear weapons under the current legal framework. 
Consequently, the relationship of the five Arctic states is to remain unbalanced in the 
security domain. The lack of internal military equilibrium is a great obstacle to the 
stability of the system.  
 Consolidation of indigenous communities. Over the last 50 years, the process 
of political consolidation has begun within many indigenous communities, with the 
ultimate objective of tackling common issues (Knell 2008: 35). Five of them are able 
to participate in the official intra-regional dialog via indigenous networks that have 
Permanent Participant status in the Arctic Council – ICC, GCI, AAC, SAAMI, and 
AIA. Since, in many cases, current policy-makers systematically exclude the native 
northerners from the Arctic states‟ legal and social systems, the incentive of the latter 
to struggle against the status quo should not be underestimated. Recent success in land 
and cash settlements from their states, as well as a presence in national 
governments,
109
 provides an important impetus for further consolidation of the 
„indigenous force‟. This process has a high potential to destabilize the Arctic system.       
Isolation of Russia. The analysis of the links between the nodes of the military 
space (S2), economic space (S3), and demographic space (S4) indicates that the 
intensity of integration varies among countries.
110
 Despite having the most developed 
and populous northern territory, Russia is somewhat isolated from the rest of the 
region. After the end of the Cold War, Russia did not join the Western bloc. In fact, 
neither party wished Russia to become a member of the European Union or NATO. 
The consequences are tangible. For example, in the security dimension, Russia does 
not conduct combined military exercises with other Arctic states; and in the economic 
dimension, it does not trade with the other Arctic states according to the rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). Besides, “the Russian Federation is also the only 
Arctic state that does not have Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the 
United States” (Knell 2008: 30). In terms of infrastructure, Russian Arctic regions are 
disconnected from most of their neighbors, as there are no long distance east-west road 
networks. 
As the operational capability of Russia‟s navy and ballistic missiles diminishes 
(due to ageing and a lack of funding for maintenance), the government has begun to 
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 See Section 3. 2, Section 3. 3, and Section 3. 4.   
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realize that the Soviet ability to balance the West is lost. The „lonely wolf‟ strategy has 
stopped paying dividends. It is still true that a bipolar international system is more 
stable than a multilateral one, but only if both players have equal material capabilities. 
In the Arctic region, the capabilities are unequal, unfavorable to Russia and favorable 
to all other Arctic states. The system‟s internal stability is, therefore, weakened.  
4. 3. Lawson W. Brigham’s “Scenarios for 2040”Adjusted for the 
Forces Strengthening and Weakening the System’s Stability  
The answer to the question of whether the Arctic region will become a future 
area of conflict or cooperation depends on a variety of factors. The stability of the 
Arctic system will be defined by interplay of forces that strengthen and weaken the 
status quo. Although the weakening factors are numerous (climate change and the 
melting of the Arctic ice; unequal distribution of relief, climate and natural resources; 
unsettled territorial disputes; unbalanced security relations; consolidation of 
indigenous communities, and isolation of Russia), they are, so far, successfully 
balanced by two strengthening factors (Cold War alliances, and post-Cold War 
normalization of relations). In other words, the realist aspirations of individual 
(national) power maximization are balanced by the liberal ideas of collective 
(international) governance in the region. However, this balance is fragile. The current 
system will be unsustainable in future without an adequate response from the forces 
strengthening the system‟s stability, to the forces weakening the system‟s stability.  
Regional-scale modeling: accuracy of prediction. Assessing the future course 
of climate change in the region depends on both the researcher‟s geopolitical 
imagination, and statistical model allowing as „accurate‟ prediction as possible, at any 
given point in time. This work focuses on the period up to 2040. Why? In 2008 the 
Arctic Council established the project „Climate Change and the Cryosphere: Snow, 
Water, Ice, and Permafrost in the Arctic‟ (SWIPA), as a follow-up to the 2004 Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) program. The study evaluated 25 models for 
their ability to simulate 20
th
 century climate parameters (e.g. surface air temperature, 
sea level atmospheric pressure, and summer sea ice extent) and came to the following 
conclusion: all models are fairly consistent for the period up to 2040, but beyond that 
the projected temperatures vary enormously (see Appendix H, p. 102). Hence, “there 
is no single best model for all purposes”, and “the predictive capacity of the models 
needs to be improved for possible impacts by the end of the century” (AMAP 2009: 
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13). To avoid falling into a methodological trap, this work limits the time span to year 
2040.  
When predicting the future of politics in the Arctic transborder region, it is 
necessary to adjust the interplay of forces weakening and strengthening the system to 
a set of standardized scenarios for the region‟s development. Since this work does not 
aim at identifying individual scenarios, it refers to Brigham‟s four “Scenarios for 
2040” (“Globalized Frontier”, “Adaptive Frontier”, “Fortress Frontier”, and 
“Equitable Frontier”). 
In 2007, the author identified four possible scenarios of the region‟s 
development by 2040, based on several core factors: global climate change, 
transportation systems, resource development, indigenous Arctic peoples, regional 
environmental degradation, the Arctic Council, and the overall geopolitical issues 
facing the region (Brigham 2007: 27). Appendix I (p. 103) illustrates the distinct 
features of each scenario.  
The first scenario, “Globalized Frontier”, assumes that the region will become 
an integral part of the global economy, with “abundant natural resources, a less-harsh 
climate, mostly sparse populations, and a geography permitting shorter global air and 
sea routes between North America and Eurasia” being the most critical factors 
influencing the development (Brigham 2007: 28). The nature of international relations 
is assumed to be driven by a realist vision of constant conflict. Integration into the 
global economy is supposed to be full (i.e. covering all sectors of the Arctic economy) 
and rapid (i.e. with a high pace of internationalization). Rising global prices for oil, 
gas, nickel, copper, zinc, coal, and freshwater should imply the region‟s natural 
resource extraction and transportation becoming economically-viable. At the same 
time, national regulation of fishing rights would lead to massive overfishing in some 
areas of the Arctic. Tourism is supposed to flourish as another commercially-efficient 
activity. Although “…anyone [will] have access by sea or air to the remotest Arctic 
regions” (ibid.), transportation would still remain in hands of national governments. 
The impacts of climatic change are supposed to be dramatic: the sea ice is estimated 
to disappear completely for a two-week period in summer, while permafrost in the 
Russian Arctic, Alaska and northern regions of Canada is expected to shrink. 
However, the profile of indigenous organization is to remain limited, as the decision-
making process remains in the hands of national governments. Five Arctic States will 
assert their sovereignty over resources beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores; 
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while “only two small regions in the central Arctic Ocean remain under international 
jurisdiction” (Brigham 2007: 29). Consequently, this scenario implies that the United 
States will ratify the UNCLOS. The main role of the Arctic Council would be to 
resolve disputes between the participant countries, and restricting the outside 
participation.   
The second scenario, “Adaptive Frontier”, assumes that the region will 
become an area of a widespread international cooperation, as “the circumpolar nations 
realize they have significant environmental, social, and economic interests and 
responsibilities in the Arctic” (Brigham 2007: 29). The region would participate in the 
globalized economy, but to a limited extent and with a slower pace. Although global 
prices for Arctic oil and gas would rise, they will still be “…not enough for all regions 
of the Arctic to be competitive” (ibid.). The fishing industries are expected to expand 
due to the warming climate, but, in contrast to the first scenario, overfishing would be 
regulated via stringent harvesting quotas and other bilateral agreements. 
Transportation systems are also expected to develop robustly, with international 
regulation of aircraft emissions being performed. Tourism is supposed to flourish, 
especially at Nunavut, Svalbard, Iceland, and Greenland. As greenhouse emissions 
are expected to remain relatively high, the change of climate and the melting of the 
Arctic ice cap would have a widespread and serious effect on the region. In contrast to 
the previous scenario, “the indigenous organizations around the Arctic [should] have 
a much higher profile and significant influence over decisions related to regional 
protection and economic development” (Brigham 2007: 29). Five Arctic States 
(including the United States, which will ratify UNCLOS) will assert their sovereignty 
rights over resources beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores, while “only two 
small regions in the central Arctic Ocean remain under international jurisdiction” 
(ibid.). The major role of the Arctic Council would be to promote sustainable 
development and social inclusion. Although the Arctic states try to restrict outside 
participation, there is still genuine pressure from outside governments (that wish the 
United Nations to have a greater role in Arctic affairs) and from several non-
governmental organizations (which want the Arctic to remain a wilderness area).     
The third scenario, “Fortress Frontier”, assumes constant tensions in 
international relations, in the spirit of classical political realism. Although the region 
is to become part of the global economic system (due to a widespread exploitation of 
natural resources by the circumpolar nations), “…any linkage [will be] orchestrated or 
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dictated by the most powerful Arctic states” (Brigham 2007: 32). Consequently, 
regional participation in the global market would be limited to mineral-based 
industries, but the pace of such integration would be rapid. Not only are the Arctic 
states‟ economies expected to boom, but fishing rights are also supposed to be denied 
to all but the Arctic states (the author uses the example of Japan being excluded from 
fishing in the Bering Sea). Regulation of air and marine traffic would remain in the 
hands of national governments due to the lack of a polar network. Specifically, Russia 
and Canada would continue to control the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest 
Passage, but some flexibility would be possible if significant economic gains are 
expected from foreign vessels transiting these routes. Tourism is expected to grow; 
and its development can, potentially, bring economic benefits to the local 
communities. However, the latter are expected to be systematically-displaced from 
their traditional homelands, as the profile of indigenous organizations is to be 
significantly limited by national governments. Since global warming is to resume 
unabated, the region will, most likely, be put under extreme environmental strain. As 
in the previous cases, the Arctic States will successfully assert their sovereignty over 
the resources beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores, with only two small 
regions in the central Arctic basin remaining under international jurisdiction. The 
Arctic Council would remain strong, but it will focus exclusively on economic and 
security concerns. The ultimate goal would be in “…making the region more 
independent and exclusionary – a position largely unchallenged by the global 
community due to the Arctic‟s collective economic and military strength… a total 
dominance over the Arctic Ocean [would be] thus achieved by a handful of Arctic 
states – the epitome of fortress mentality” (Brigham 2007: 33).   
The fourth scenario, “Equitable Frontier”, assumes that the region will become 
an area of international cooperation, in the spirit of classical liberalism. The Arctic 
states are ready to share their Arctic territories as integral parts of the global economy, 
but they choose gradualism as the main integration strategy. Although the extraction 
of mineral resources and fishing would still constitute the basis of the Arctic 
economies, these commercial activities would be “…tempered by greater 
consideration of broad social and environmental concerns” (Brigham 2007: 33). 
Respecting the environment and goodwill cooperation among the Arctic states will 
become a norm. In other words, non-economic considerations and tight international 
regulation would prevent mineral-based economic activities (oil, gas, and mineral 
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production) from snowballing. Traditional practices (reindeer herding, forestry, and 
fishing) will be prioritized. Arctic freshwater will become a valuable global 
commodity. Russia and Canada will develop plans for a network of pipelines to carry 
water south from their Arctic territories. Transportation will become a key Arctic 
industry; regional maritime commerce will increase fivefold due to the melting of the 
sea ice, causing air freight over polar routes to shrink modestly. International 
regulation will emphasize environmental protection of the key transport routes. 
Tourism will boom, so national parliaments will establish additional protected 
wilderness areas and biodiversity reserves. They will also add territories to existing 
Arctic national parks. The profile of indigenous peoples‟ organizations will be high 
and, as a result, new social and economic incentives will emerge.
111
 Consequently, in 
contrast to the three previous scenarios, the impact of climate change will be less 
dramatic. Boundary dispute in the Barents (Norway vs. Russia)
112
 and Beaufort 
(Canada vs. the United States) seas will be resolved, the United States will ratify 
UNCLOS, and therefore all Arctic states will assert sovereignty rights over resources 
beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores. The Arctic Council will be reoriented 
toward social equality and environmental well-being. Finally, in contrast to the 
previous cases, the restriction of outside participation will be seriously limited.
113
    
 Instead of preferring one out of four scenarios, the author tries to offer a 
structure for thinking about the region‟s future and its global impacts:  
…These four scenarios of the Arctic are designed to be provocative but 
plausible. Hopefully, they will stimulate strategic thought and rational 
discussion about how the Arctic region should evolve throughout the 
twenty-first century (Brigham 2007: 34).   
In fact, many authors agree that the region is about to face extraordinary 
changes, but do not offer objective predictions about its future shape (Dowdeswell and 
Hambrey 2002, Einarsson 2004, Crawford 2008, Sale and Potapov 2010). In terms of 
the theory of international relations, the spectrum of Brigham‟s scenarios is wide – 
starting with defensive realism (“Fortress Frontier”), ending with liberal universalism 
(“Globalized Frontier”), and positioning “Adaptive Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier” 
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 For example, further development of the University of the Arctic; or revenue sharing from tourism, 
transportation, and minerals extraction.  
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 This dispute has already been resolved.  
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 For example, the Arctic Council will broker an agreement between Canada, Russia, and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to allow the settlement of 30.000 environmental refugees in 
subarctic territories (Brigham 2007: 34).  
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somewhere between the two. Because, as has been pointed out by Gyula Csurgai, the 
main aim of geopolitics is to provide a policy-maker with a concrete diagnosis of the 
future state of affairs within a given region (Csurgai 2008: 48), this work adjusts 
Lawson W. Brigham‟s scenarios, firstly, for the forces strengthening the Arctic 
system; and, secondly, to the forces weakening the Arctic system. 
Adjusting for the forces strengthening the Arctic system. Three factors 
promoting the system‟s stability – certain elements of the physical environment, Cold 
War alliances, and post-Cold War normalization of relations – should be taken into 
consideration when choosing among four possible scenarios of the Arctic region by 
2040. Although they affect all four scenarios, influence is at its maximum in case of 
scenario one (“Globalized Frontier”) and scenario three (“Fortress Frontier”), as both 
predict a reduction in cooperation between the Arctic states, in favor of intense 
competition.  
First of all, some elements of the Arctic physical environment (the lowest 
atmospheric temperature on Earth due to the highest latitude; existence of the „Arctic 
day‟ and „Arctic night‟; polar lights and sound effects between 60 and 72 degrees 
north latitude; etc.) do not depend on human activity in the region. Since it is unlikely 
that these characteristics would disappear by 2040, they will still define the Arctic 
states‟ military, economic, demographic, and information policies in polar regions, and 
determine the relations between the countries. Then, as demonstrated in Section 4.1, a 
continuation of logic of Cold War alliances contributes to the promotion of intra-
region dialog between the national governments of all Arctic states, i.e. not only 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States (the long-term 
military and economic allies), but also Russia (which, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, is little opposed to „Western‟ integration practices). On the one hand, as 
Canada, Greenland, Norway, and the United States are connected by NATO; 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden – by EU, EEA and Nordic Council; Canada 
and the United States – by NAFTA; Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and 
the United States – by the WTO. It is highly unlikely that these countries will risk their 
long-standing alliance relationships in line with Brigham‟s “Fortress Frontier”. Also, 
since these countries are liberal democracies which respect the rights of individuals, 
the profile of indigenous peoples‟ organizations will grow in future. However, this 
condition goes against the prerequisites of “Globalized Frontier” and “Fortress 
Frontier”, where national interests prevail over individual ones.  
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On the other hand, although Russia is not part of the integration networks 
mentioned above, there are evident signs that it does not plan to enter into direct 
confrontation with the rest of the Arctic states.
114
 In contrast, as visible from the 
strategic behavior in other international regions, Russia seeks pragmatic cooperation 
with the West and benefits from the current (post-Soviet) legal configuration. Its 
uninterrupted willingness to join the WTO illustrates the case. New diplomatic 
incentives have emerged between the former Cold War-rivals. Despite the fact that 
they are shallow,
115
 they indicate a gradual convergence of interests between all Arctic 
states.   
Consequently, due to the continuation of the Cold War logic in intra-regional 
relations, no Arctic state has any preference for using military means of power 
projection over relying on diplomatic channels of inter-governmental communication. 
In contrast, all coastal states believe in each other‟s rationality and their own ability to 
predict the behavior of its counterparts. Coupled with factually-restricted outside 
participation, the balance of power in the region is clearly defined. Hence, as alliances 
tend to gain influence over time, and since all Arctic states are in favor of cooperation 
instead of conflict, the existing cooperation frameworks will clearly strengthen by 
2040. The current process of harmonization of national standards of traffic regulation 
also assumes that the Arctic states will, most likely, rely on the international system of 
traffic control instead of national ones, as the latter has proved to be inefficient in 
other oceans.
116
 Finally, in the “Fortress Frontier” scenario, the author seems to come 
up with a far-fetched idea of the Arctic Council being concerned exclusively with 
security and economy issues.  
Therefore, despite having the right to exist as a potential „extreme case‟, the 
“Fortress Frontier” scenario is highly improbable. The “Globalized Frontier” scenario 
is more realistic, but it still contains improbable essentials.
117
 In contrast, the 
“Adaptive Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier” scenarios are better suited to the forces 
strengthening the stability of the Arctic geostrategic system.   
Adjusting for the forces weakening the Arctic system. The two „optimistic‟ 
scenarios offered by Brigham, “Adaptive Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier”, should 
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 There is no reference to the possibility of a direct military attack on the other Arctic states in 
Russia‟s “Arctic Policy until 2020 and Beyond” by President Medvedev (2008). 
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 Decisions of those are not legally-binding. 
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 The idea of UNCLOS is to create a harmonized universal system of marine regulation.   
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 Among others, the national regulation of air and marine traffic, and the limited profile of indigenous 
peoples‟ organizations.  
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be adjusted for the forces weakening the system (discussed in Section 4.2). First of all, 
the actual effect of climate change and consequential melting of the Arctic ice are not 
considered in proper depth. The author summarizes the essentials of the phenomenon, 
but does present a factual application of particular territorial changes in the ice cover 
in both scenarios. However, as the change of climate has the potential to alter basic 
configurations within all geostrategic action spaces of the Arctic region, the objective 
manifestations of the process should not be omitted. Particularly, there is a significant 
difference between the observable sea-ice (as of September 2002) and the projected 
sea-ice (2070-2090), see Appendix J (p. 104). It is clear that, due to the intensive 
shrinkage of ice, the region‟s maritime routes will be open for navigation for the most 
of the year. However, as the legal status of both the Northern Sea Route and the 
Northwest Passage is not adjusted to the coming change in the physical environment, 
it is unlikely that either Russia or Canada will give up sovereignty claims over these 
routes in future, without at least a diplomatic struggle. Hence, Brigham‟s “Equitable 
Frontier”, which does not predict any conflict among the Arctic states, is too idealistic 
and, therefore, unlikely.  
Secondly, the unequal distribution of underwater topographic relief, climate, 
and natural resources is another source of conflict between the Arctic states in future. 
The conflict of interests is the product of some states continuing to feel discriminated 
by states that gain substantial shares of the region‟s natural wealth (specifically, on the 
continental shelf). Thirdly, territorial disputes are likely to exist in future. In addition 
to the questionable status of passages, problematic border delimitation in the Beaufort 
Sea (Canada vs. the United States) and Hans Island (Canada vs. Denmark) are likely to 
persist in future. In fact, all scenarios must be adjusted to the fact that, so far, the 
United States has not ratified UNCLOS. And, since there is no region-specific 
integration framework that would have jurisdiction over addressing the territorial 
claims, boundary and passage disputes, it is unlikely that any convergence of the 
Arctic states‟ interests will be smooth. Besides, in contrast to the “Equitable Frontier” 
scenario, the Arctic system will be less resistant to an internal shock, due to the lack of 
a common mechanism for conflict resolution.  
Fourthly, the current institutional isolation of Russia will not disappear by 
2040. In general, the pace of Russia‟s inclusion into the Western integration 
frameworks is, so far, relatively low (e.g. cooperation achievements of the NATO-
Russia Council, or WTO participation). It is, therefore, unlikely that the former rivals 
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will become close allies, as neither strategic policy indicates any signs of this 
situation. Even though significant, quantitative upgrades may occur in regional 
relations; a systemic, qualitative change is unlikely to occur between the Arctic states 
in less than 30 years. At the same time, the current unbalanced security relations are 
likely to exist in future. The problem rises from inside the region (e.g. the region‟s 
buffer position and a consequent military oversaturation) and comes from the system‟s 
neighborhood (discriminative nature of NPT). Consequently, persisting competition 
between the Arctic states is inevitable in future.  
 Considering the role of the Arctic Council in future, the “Equitable Frontier” 
is too optimistic. Although governments of all Arctic states manifest strategies of a 
greater concern for social equity and environmental well-being, the ongoing 
development of the Arctic states‟ northernmost lands is governed, primarily, by 
incentives to invest in basic economic activities (oil, gas, and mineral resources 
extraction). Today, the Arctic states invest heavily in exploration of the region‟s 
natural richness. It is unlikely that they will renounce the collection of dividends over 
the next 30 years. Finally, the regional policies of the Arctic states do not indicate any 
willingness to allow outside participation in future, in either economic or security 
terms.  
 
What shape will the region have in 30 years? Although there is always the 
possibility of an unpredictable change, a „rough‟ prediction comes from Lawson W. 
Brigham‟s four scenarios. Previous analysis has demonstrated that the “Fortress 
Frontier” and “Equitable Frontier” scenarios are not realistic, as the former is too 
pessimistic and the latter is too optimistic. Taking into consideration the essentials of 
the five Arctic geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) and the forces strengthening and weakening 
the system‟s stability, a „hybrid‟ scenario seems to be the most accurate. It is based on 
the following assumptions:  
- Competition (conflict) is the main engine of international relations;  
- Regional integration into the global economy is controlled (limited) and 
gradual;  
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- Economic activities are not yet booming (due to economic, rather than political, 
reasons)
118
;  
- The fishing industry is open to the Arctic states (which will regulate the rights);  
- Air and marine traffic is regulated internationally;  
- Tourism flourishes;  
- The profile of indigenous peoples‟ organizations is high;  
- The impacts of climate change over the physical and human environments are 
dramatic; 
- The Arctic states assert their sovereignty rights over resources beyond 200 
nautical miles from their shores; 
- The Arctic Council serves as a main dispute resolution mechanism; 
- Outside participation is restricted to the Arctic states.       
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trade, but not upon the predominance of social equality agenda among the Arctic states‟ politicians.  
80 
 
5. Conclusion 
Where is Hans Island? Why is this uninhabited, 100-meter-long barren knoll 
of rocks located in Kennedy Channel of the Nares Strait claimed by both Denmark 
and Canada? Why did Russia launched the Arktika mission by sending a submarine to 
the bottom of the Arctic Ocean to plant a flag at the North Pole? Why did Canada 
respond with the construction of new military bases and upgrade of its warships and 
coastal patrol vessels?  
Until recently, most people not actually living within the Arctic Circle treated 
the polar region as a remote place about which they knew (and needed to know) little 
or nothing (Snowman 1993: 14). Today, the Arctic is no longer a no-man‟s land of 
interest only to outdoor adventurers and military strategists. In fact, “in the not-too-
distant future, the forces of climate change are going to transform this icy world into a 
new economic frontier” (Zellen 2009: 184). This change will ultimately bring about a 
new chapter in polar history. Since “it is undeniable that many Arctic issues and the 
conflicts associated with them are international or transnational in scope”, scholars 
and policy-makers should be aware of the changing geostrategic role of the region. 
This work has aimed to fill the gap in the civil scientific agenda by offering its 
own, two-stage version of a systemic, dynamic, and interdisciplinary analysis of the 
developments in the Arctic transborder region; by fixing the region‟s southern border 
at the Arctic Circle, adjusting to the premises of new geopolitics, using systemic 
modeling, and viewing geostrategic analysis as an obligatory academic contribution to 
the „art‟ of statecraft.  
The first stage of analysis is inductive, descriptive, and static. It defines the 
Arctic region as a system of five geostrategic action spaces: physical space (S1), 
military space (S2), economic space (S3), demographic space (S4), and information 
space (S5). The region‟s physical environment is fundamentally interconnected with 
the human-made constructs; while the former is extremely vulnerable to human inputs 
(accidental and intentional), the latter are subject to the influence of ice, diverse 
topographical relief and climate, and the unequal distribution of natural resources. 
Then, a social network analysis is applied to the four human-constructed geostrategic 
spaces (S2-S5) – i.e. the basic networks of relationship (links) between the key actors 
(nodes) is created. Matrices of symmetrical relationships for military space (S2), 
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economic space (S3), and demographic space (S4) are constructed to demonstrate the 
links‟ intensity. 
As a result, the Arctic military space (S2) is defined by the region‟s buffer 
position and the legacy of the Cold War (excessive nuclear arsenals), by the seven 
Arctic states as the only nodes, and by the varying intensity of relationships between 
the nodes (NATO versus Russia). The gradually-expanding Arctic economic space 
(S3) proved to be characterized by the existence of two economies, subsistence and 
global; the strong influence of an external actor, the European Union; the disparity in 
economic development and internal linkages; and the disparity in the intensity of 
linkages between the nodes. The Arctic demographic space (S4) consists of the 
following elements: two social spaces, indigenous and modern; disparity in the level 
of social inclusion (social services are better for those indigenous inhabitants who 
have settled land claims with their respective governments); indigenous and non-
indigenous Arctic agglomerations as the nodes; strong influence of an external actor, 
the European Union; and a significant disparity in the intensity of linkages between 
the nodes. Finally, the Arctic information space (S5) is defined by sparse population 
disconnect, the reliance on cellular phone capabilities, and Scandinavian strength and 
Russian backwardness.  
Also, in order to demonstrate the fact that changes in one action space 
ultimately transform other spaces, ten possible channels of inter-space effects are 
illustrated: buffer position and type of weaponry (S1→S2); two economies and sector 
distribution (S1→S3); the lifestyle of indigenous and non-indigenous populations 
(S1→S4); population disconnect (S1→S5); nuclear waste (S2→S4); the need for 
protection (S3→S2); two social systems (S3→S4); e-commerce (S5→S3); mobility 
(S5→S2); and social inclusion (S5→S4).  
The second stage of analysis is deductive, analytical, and dynamic. It 
demonstrates that the five geostrategic spaces (S1-S5) are in a state of constant flux, in 
terms of both the physical environment and human activity. The system is, therefore, 
dynamic. As the region can turn into an area of conflict or cooperation, the work 
attempts to predict which scenario will prevail by 2040. Firstly, the forces 
strengthening the system‟s stability (physical environment, Cold War alliances, and 
post-Cold War normalization of relations), as well as those weakening the system‟s 
stability (climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice; unequal distribution of 
underwater topographical relief, climate and natural resources; unsettled territorial 
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disputes; unbalanced security relations; consolidation of indigenous communities, and 
isolation of Russia) are identified. Secondly, Lawson W. Brigham‟s four “Scenarios 
for 2040” (“Globalized Frontier”, “Adaptive Frontier”, “Fortress Frontier”, and 
“Equitable Frontier”) are adjusted to the interplay of these forces.  
Finally, a „hybrid‟ scenario is offered as the most probable outcome of 
development in the region over the next 30 years. It is moderate: while assuming 
competition (conflict) to be the main engine of international relations, it predicts that 
regional integration into the global economy will be controlled (limited) and gradual; 
economic activities will be slow to boom; the fishing industry will be open to the 
Arctic states (which will regulate the rights); air and marine traffic will be regulated 
internationally; tourism will flourish; the profile of indigenous peoples‟ organizations 
will be high; the impacts of climate change will be dramatic over physical and human 
environments; the Arctic states to assert their sovereignty rights over resources 
beyond 200 nautical miles from their shores (thus the United States is assumed to 
ratify UNCLOS); the Arctic Council will serve as the main dispute resolution 
mechanism; and outside (external) participation will be restricted to the Arctic states.       
The main logic of this work is in line with majority of modern polar analyses – 
the region is about to face a dramatic change in its physical environment and human 
constructs. In this sense, the conclusions are similar to those by, among others, 
Osherenko and Young 1989, Chaturvedi 1996, Bird et al. 2004, Christopher and Fast 
2008, and Crawford et al. 2008. At the same time, this work does not agree with 
authors who stress the possibility of a real military conflict between the Arctic states 
(for example, Reid 2007). In contrast, despite the conflictive nature of international 
relations in the region, it assumes diplomatic action to be the main tool for resolving 
disputes (in spirit of Mearsheimer 2001). The systemic geopolitical approach is not 
frequent among experts on either geopolitical theory or polar affairs. Hence, in line 
with arguments of Dussouy (2010), Csurgai (2009) and Knell (2008), this work 
attempts to advance the study of international politics with a systemic geopolitical 
treatment.  
So far, the research is not complete. It can be extended in several ways. 
Firstly, the study can be enriched by the assessment of the role of external actors, both 
national and international (e.g. China, European Union, United Nations). Secondly, 
internal links of inter-space affection (i.e. not only primary, but also secondary, 
tertiary, and higher order derivative effects) can be identified and assessed to a greater 
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extent. Thirdly, the Arctic states‟ strategies can be contrasted via the use of statistical 
apparatus, for example game theory. Fourthly, the subjective side of geopolitics 
(geopolitical representations, „mental maps‟) can be added to the objective research, 
since the former may have a significant influence upon the latter. Finally, the role of 
supranational, sub-national, and non-state nodes, including the links between them, 
should also be assessed.  
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Appendix A: Undiscovered oil and gas in the Arctic  
 
 
 
a). Summary of Results of the Circum-Arctic Resources Appraisal by USGS 
 
Source: Bird et al. 2008, p. 1 
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Appendix A (continued): Undiscovered Oil and Gas in the Arctic  
 
 
b). Undiscovered Oil within the Arctic Circle 
Source: Bird et al. 2008, pp. 3-4 
 
 
c). Undiscovered Gas within the Arctic Circle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bird et al. 2008, pp. 3-4 
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Appendix B: Military Space – Matrix of Symmetrical                              
Relationships Showing Intensity 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
Canada 
(**) 
OSCE 
NATO 
(*) 
OSCE 
(**) 
OSCE 
NATO 
(*) 
OSCE 
(*) 
OSCE 
(***) 
OSCE 
NATO 
NORAD 
Denmark  
(**) 
OSCE 
NORDCAPS 
(***) 
OSCE 
NATO 
NORDCAPS 
(*) 
OSCE 
(**) 
OSCE 
NORDCAPS 
(**) 
OSCE 
NATO 
Finland   
(**) 
OSCE 
NORDCAPS 
(*) 
OSCE 
(**) 
OSCE 
NORDCAPS 
(*) 
OSCE 
Norway 
 
   
(*) 
OSCE 
(**) 
OSCE 
NORDCAPS 
(**) 
OSCE 
NATO 
Russia 
 
    
(*) 
OSCE 
(*) 
OSCE 
Sweden      
(*) 
OSCE 
(*) – One-channel link („shallow integration‟)  
(**) – Two-channel link („moderate integration‟) 
(***) – Three-channel link („deep integration‟) 
 
 
Canada Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
Shallow 
integration 
(*) 
Finland 
Russia 
Sweden 
Russia 
Canada 
Russia 
United 
States 
Russia 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
United 
States 
Canada 
Russia 
United 
States 
 
Finland 
Russia 
Sweden 
Moderate 
integration 
(**) 
Denmark 
Norway 
Canada 
Finland 
Sweden 
United   
States 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Canada 
Finland 
Sweden 
United 
States 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Denmark 
Norway 
 
Deep 
integration 
(***) 
United 
States 
Norway  Denmark   Canada 
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Appendix C: Activities in Nature-Based Sectors                                                               
in the Arctic Economic Regions 
 Fishing Agriculture, 
livestock, 
forestry 
Electric power 
production 
Mining and 
petroleum 
Tourism (Maritime) 
transport 
activities 
Arctic 
Norway 
Arctic cod, shrimp, 
capelin, salmon, 
trout 
Reindeer-
herding, 
hunting, 
trapping 
Hydropower, 
windpower 
Offshore oil and 
gas production, 
offshore 
exploration 
drilling, coal 
App. 1.7 
mill. guest 
nights in 
2002  
Many 
important 
navigation 
routes along 
the coast, from 
both Norway 
and Russia 
 
Arctic 
Sweden 
No significant 
fishing activity 
Timber, barley, 
wheat, sugar 
beets, meat, 
milk 
Hydropower  Iron ore, copper, 
lead, zinc, gold, 
silver, tungsten, 
uranium, arsenic, 
feldspar 
 
App. 2.7%  
of GNP 
Ice floes in the 
Gulf of Bothnia 
can interfere 
with maritime 
traffic 
Arctic 
Finland 
Inland fishing: 
herring, sprat, 
vendace, salmon, 
trout 
Barley, oats, 
sugar beets, 
potatoes, milk, 
poultry, pigs, 
cattle, reindeer 
and forestry 
(timber) 
Nuclear 
energy, wood 
fuel, oil, coal, 
natural gas, 
peat and 
hydropower 
Iron ore, copper, 
lead, zinc, 
chromite, nickel, 
gold, silver, 
limestone 
4.4 mill. 
guest nights 
in 2004 
Ice floes in the 
Gulf of Bothnia 
can interfere 
with maritime 
traffic 
Green-
land 
Northern prawns, 
halibut, lumpfish, 
snow crab, cod  
 
 Forage crops, 
garden and 
greenhouse 
vegetables, 
sheep, reindeer 
 Hydropower Zinc, lead, iron 
ore, coal, 
molybdenum, 
gold, platinum, 
uranium, onshore  
oil and gas 
production 
 
App. 64000 
guest nights 
in 2004 
Ships, aviation 
Russia North-west:                   
cod, herring, 
saithe, capelin, 
northern shrimp, 
halibut;  
Siberia:                              
no significant 
fishing activity; 
Chukotka:                      
large-scale trawl 
fisheries, ground-
fish  (app. 90% 
walleye pollock) 
 
Timber, much 
of the country 
lacks proper 
soils and 
climates (either 
too cold or too 
dry) for 
agriculture 
Relies on fossil 
fuels for most 
of its electricity 
generation: 
app. 65% 
conventional 
thermal 
Offshore and 
onshore oil and 
gas production 
and exploration, 
gemstones, 
fertilizer, nickel, 
copper, platinum, 
apatite, tin, 
diamonds, gold 
and coal 
Science-
based 
tourism and 
journalists. 
Rapidly 
growing 
industry 
Unfavorably 
located in 
relation to 
major sea lanes 
of the world 
Alaska Ground-fish (app. 
75% walleye 
pollock), salmon, 
halibut, shellfish  
Timber, 
agriculture 
Natural gas, 
hydropower, 
petroleum, coal 
Mining for lead 
zinc and gold, 
off- and onshore 
oil and gas 
production and 
exploration 
Season-
dependent – 
90% during 
the summer, 
but 
expanding  
 
International 
air freight 
important 
Canada West:                                     
no significant 
fishing activity; 
Center and East: 
capelin, cod, sand 
lance, herring, 
halibut, plaice, 
snow crab, 
northern shrimp 
Forestry, fur, 
trapping, 
greenhouse 
vegetable 
potential  
Relies on fossil 
fuels for most 
of its electricity 
generation 
Onshore oil 
production and 
onshore gas 
exploration, 
mining for 
diamonds, sand 
and gravel, lead, 
zinc, copper and 
gold 
App. 85000 
guest total in 
2002, Aurora 
Tourism, 
vital and 
growing 
industry 
Opening of 
north-west 
passage 
Source: Glomsrod and Aslaksen 2006, p. 94 (excerpts) 
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Appendix D: Economic Space – Matrix of Symmetrical                              
Relationships Showing Intensity 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden United States 
Canada 
(*) 
WTO 
(*) 
WTO 
(*) 
WTO 
(*) 
G-8 
(*) 
WTO 
(***) 
NAFTA 
WTO 
G-8 
Denmark  
(****) 
BEAC  
EU 
Nordic 
Council 
WTO 
(****) 
BEAC 
EEA 
Nordic 
Council 
WTO 
(**) 
BEAC 
PCA 
(****) 
BEAC 
EU 
WTO 
Nordic 
Council 
(*) 
WTO 
Finland   
(****) 
BEAC 
EEA 
WTO 
Nordic 
Council 
(**) 
BEAC 
PCA 
(****) 
BEAC 
EU 
WTO 
Nordic 
Council 
(*) 
WTO 
Norway 
 
   
(*) 
BEAC 
(****) 
BEAC 
EEA 
WTO 
Nordic 
Council 
(*) 
WTO 
Russia 
 
    
(**) 
BEAC 
PCA 
(*) 
G-8 
Sweden      
(*) 
WTO 
(*) – One-channel link („shallow integration‟)   (***) – Three-channel link („deep integration‟) 
(**) – Two-channel link („moderate integration‟)  (****) – Four-channel link („extra deep integration‟) 
 
Canada Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
Shallow 
integration 
(*) 
Denmark  
Finland 
Norway 
Russia 
Sweden 
Canada 
United 
States 
Canada 
United 
States 
Canada 
Russia 
United 
States 
Canada 
Norway 
United 
States 
Canada 
United 
States 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Russia 
Sweden 
Moderate 
integration 
(**) 
 Russia Russia 
 
 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
Russia 
 
 
Deep 
integration 
(***) 
United 
States 
     Canada 
Extra deep 
integration 
(****) 
 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
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Appendix E: Demographic Space – Matrix of Symmetrical                              
Relationships Showing Intensity 
 
Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
Canada 
(**) 
AC 
ICC 
(*) 
AC 
(*) 
AC 
(**) 
AC 
ICC 
(*) 
AC 
(****) 
AC 
AAC  
ICC 
GCI 
Denmark  
(*) 
AC 
(*) 
AC 
(**) 
AC 
ICC 
(*) 
AC 
(**) 
AC 
ICC 
Finland   
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(*) 
AC 
Norway 
 
   
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(*) 
AC 
Russia 
 
    
(**) 
AC 
SAAMI 
(***) 
AC 
AIA  
ICC 
Sweden      
(*) 
AC 
(*) – One-channel link („shallow integration‟)   (***) – Three-channel link („deep integration‟) 
(**) – Two-channel link („moderate integration‟)  (****) – Four-channel links („extra deep integration‟) 
 
 
Canada Denmark Finland Norway Russia Sweden 
United 
States 
Shallow 
integration 
(*) 
 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
Canada 
United 
States 
Denmark 
Canada 
United 
States 
 
 
Canada 
Denmark 
United 
States 
 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Moderate 
integration 
(**) 
Denmark 
Russia 
Canada 
Russia 
United 
States 
 
Norway  
Russia 
Sweden 
Finland 
Russia 
Sweden 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
Norway 
Sweden 
Finland 
Norway 
Russia 
 
Denmark 
Deep 
integration 
(***) 
    
United 
States 
 Russia 
Extra 
Deep 
Integration 
(****) 
United 
States 
     Canada 
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Appendix F: The Effects of Climate Change on Arctic Biodiversity 
 
 
 
 
Source: <www.arctic-council.org/article/2011/4/effects_of_sea-ice_loss_on_biodiversity>. 
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Appendix G: Arctic Sovereignty Claims 
 
 
Canada Russia Denmark Norway United States 
UNCLOS 
ratification 
2003 1997 2004 1996 Has not been 
ratified; 
approved by 
President 
Bush and 
Senate 
Foreign 
Relations 
Committee 
UNCLOS 
submission 
By 2013 
Canada will 
make a “very 
strong 
claim”, 
according to 
NR Minister 
Gary Lunn 
Dec. 2001 By 2014 2006 No 
submission 
Territorial 
claim 
Submission 
pending; will 
be roughly 
1 000 000   
sq km 
The largest 
Arctic claim: 
North Pole, 
extensions 
into the 
Central 
Arctic Ocean, 
the Bering 
Sea, the 
Barents Sea 
and the Sea 
of Okhotsk. 
Arctic states 
and UN call 
for more data 
Submission 
pending 
Extensions in 
three parts of 
the Arctic 
and northeast 
Atlantic: the 
Loop Hole in 
the Barents 
Sea; the 
Western 
Nansen Basin 
in the Arctic 
Ocean; and 
the Banana 
Hole in the 
Norwegian 
Sea. Further 
submissions 
to be made 
No official 
UNCLOS 
claim  
Existing 
disputes 
Hans Island, 
Lincoln Sea 
(with 
Denmark); 
Beaufort Sea 
(with USA); 
Northwest 
Passage (with 
international 
community); 
Lomonosov 
Ridge (with 
Russia, 
Denmark) 
Lomonosov 
Ridge and 
Mendeleev 
Ridge (with 
Canada, 
Denmark)  
Lomonosov 
Ridge and 
Mendeleev 
Ridge (with 
Canada, 
Russia); 
Hans Island 
 Beaufort Sea 
(with 
Canada); 
Northwest 
Passage (with 
Canada). 
USA finds 
“major 
flaws” in 
Russian 
submission, 
claims 
Lomonosov 
Ridge outside 
of area state 
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Continued Canada Russia Denmark Norway United States 
Diplomatic 
action 
Ilulissat 
Declaration; 
mapping 
partnership 
with USA 
(2008); 
mapping 
partnership 
with 
Denmark; 
Ambassador 
for 
Circumpolar 
Affairs 
(1994, since 
discont-ed); 
Founding 
chair, Arctic 
Council; 
supporting 
munitions 
clean-up in 
northern 
Russia; Hans 
Island 
weather 
monitoring 
(with 
Denmark) 
Ilulissat 
Declaration; 
cooperate with 
Denmark on 
LOMROG 
mapping 
expedition; 
member, 
Arctic 
Council; treaty 
on maritime 
delimitation 
and 
cooperation in 
the Barents 
Sea ratified  
 
Ilulissat 
Declaration 
(host); 
mapping 
partnership 
with Canada 
(LORITA-1); 
cooperate 
with Russia 
and Sweden 
on 
LOMROG 
mapping 
expedition; 
Hans Island 
weather 
monitoring 
(with 
Canada); 
member, 
Arctic 
Council  
Ilulissat 
Declaration; 
current chair, 
Arctic 
Council; 
treaty on 
maritime 
delimitation 
and 
cooperation 
in the Barents 
Sea ratified 
 
Ilulissat 
Declaration; 
member, 
Arctic 
Council 
Military 
action 
Plans to build 
two military 
bases: army 
training 
centre in 
Resolute Bay 
and deep-sea 
port in 
Nunalivut: 
yearly ranger 
patrols across 
the Arctic; 
$720 million 
icebreaker; 
$3 billion 
upgrade for 
warships and 
coastal patrol 
vessels 
Arktika 
mission, 
2007: flag-
planting on 
North Pole; 
warship 
patrols in 
Arctic, first 
since Cold 
War; 
increased 
Russian air 
traffic in 
Canada‟s 
Arctic 
airspace; 
cooperation 
with Norway 
on Barents 
Sea oil and 
gas 
  U.S. Coast 
Guard 
icebreakers in 
Arctic (2007) 
to map 
Alaska‟s sea 
floor 
Source: Crawford et al. 2008, pp. 15-6. 
102 
 
Appendix H: Model Projections of Global Warming                                     
under Different Scenarios 
 
 
 
 Source: AMAP 2009, p. 13. 
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Appendix I: Lawson W. Brigham’s “Four Scenarios for 2040” 
Source: Brigham 2007, pp. 27-34. 
 
 Scenario One: 
“Globalized 
Frontier” 
Scenario Two: 
“Adaptive 
Frontier” 
Scenario Three: 
“Fortress 
Frontier” 
Scenario Four: 
“Equitable 
Frontier” 
Nature of 
international 
relations 
Conflict Cooperation Conflict Cooperation 
Integration 
into global 
economy 
Full, rapid Limited, gradual Limited, rapid Full, gradual 
Economic 
activity 
Booming Not yet booming Booming Not yet booming 
Fishing 
Free                         
(Arctic States-
only) 
Regulated           
(Arctic States-
only) 
Free                       
(Arctic States-
only) 
Regulated       
(Arctic States-
only) 
Air and marine 
traffic 
National 
regulation 
International 
regulation 
National 
regulation 
International 
regulation 
Tourism Flourishing Flourishing Flourishing Flourishing 
Impact of 
climatic 
change 
Dramatic Dramatic Dramatic Less dramatic 
The profile of 
indigenous 
peoples’ 
organizations 
Limited High Limited High 
Scramble for 
the region 
Arctic States 
assert their 
sovereignty over 
resources 
beyond 200 nm 
Arctic States 
assert their 
sovereignty over 
resources beyond 
200 nm 
Arctic States 
assert their 
sovereignty 
over resources 
beyond 200 nm 
Arctic States 
assert their 
sovereignty over 
resources beyond 
200 nm 
Role of the 
Arctic Council 
Dispute 
resolution 
Sustainable 
development, 
social inclusion 
Economic and 
security 
concerns 
Social equity, 
environmental 
well-being 
Outside 
participation 
Restricted 
Partially-
restricted 
Restricted 
Partially-
restricted 
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Appendix J: Projected Sea-Ice and Winter Surface                           
Temperature Increase around 2090 (
o
C) 
 
 
 
Source: Ahlenius et al. 2010, p. 34. 
 
 
 
